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On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why
the Proposal To Divide the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Is
Not Such a Good Idea.
Thomas E. Baker*
I. INTRODUCTION
Senate Bill 948, now pending before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
would divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
into two circuits: a new Ninth Circuit composed of Arizona, California,
and Nevada, and a new Twelfth Circuit composed of Alaska, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mar-
iana Islands.' This is not a good idea.
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.S. cum laude 1974, Florida State University;
J.D. with high honors 1977, University of Florida.
The author served as Associate Reporter to the Subcommittee on Structure of the Federal
Courts Study Committee (1989-90). This article has been adapted from a background paper written
for the Subcommittee on Structure-Judge Levin H. Campbell (Chair); General Counsel J. Vincent
Aprile II; Morris Harrel, Esquire; Senator Howell T. Heflin; Judge Judith N. Keep; and Reporter
Denis J. Hauptly-and this article has benefitted from this involvement. The author also thanks
the various witnesses before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative
Practice who provided their statements, which are relied on here. The views expressed here,
however, are those of the author alone.
The author gratefully acknowledges the support of a research grant from the Texas Tech
University School of Law which enabled this adaptation.
1. S. 948, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
Representative Morrison (Wash.) recently introduced a related bill that also would divide the
present Ninth Circuit but would reassign the states and territories differently to create a new
Ninth Circuit composed of Arizona, California, Nevada, Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana
Islands, and a new Twelfth Circuit composed of Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Wash-
ington. H.R. 4900, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). The House bill was referred to committee and
a hearing was held before the Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Administration of Justice on June 13, 1990. 136 CONG. RIc. D730 (daily ed.
June 13, 1990). This difference in possible realignments could detract significantly from the
momentum to divide, as was true during the protracted congressional consideration of dividing
the Fifth Circuit. See infra text accompanying notes 38-54. Bar leaders in Guam and Hawaii
oppose any arrangement that assigns California to a different circuit. Hawaii State Bar Association,
Resolution in Opposition to Senate Bill 948 (June 26, 1989) (contained in letter from Charles W.
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Not that there is anything wrong per se with redrawing circuit
boundaries. Even a brief historical account demonstrates that Congress
has redrawn circuit boundaries quite regularly. Indeed, my own incli-
nation is that Congress ought to redraw the circuit boundaries most
dramatically. However, splitting the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit into two new courts is not a good idea now, because, first, it
will do nothing to help the problems of that particular court, and,
second, the problems of the courts of appeals generally might be helped
by a more systematic approach.
The "crisis" presently facing the Ninth Circuit is in no way atypical
of what other courts of appeals are experiencing, and, adjusting for
scale, a good argument can be made that Ninth Circuit innovations in
administration are ahead of other circuits. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that simply dividing the Ninth Circuit would result in any
lasting improvements for the two new circuits. For now, it is more
desirable to continue the careful study of the Ninth Circuit as one
possible model of national reform. Indeed, the preferable congressional
inquiry would be to reconceptualize the system of intermediate courts
and, perhaps, to consider whether a radical restructuring is in order.
Congress should accept the general suggestion of the Federal Courts
Study Committee for a careful five year study of structural alternatives
for the entire tier of federal intermediate courts.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY
The existing circuit boundary lines-depicted on that map of the
United States for lawyers in the front of Federal Reporter, Second
Key, President Hawaii State Bar Association, to Hon. Harold Fong, Chief Judge, United States
District Court, Hawaii (June 26, 1989)) (copy on file at Arizona State Law Journal); Letter from
William J. Blair to Senator Howell T. Heflin (Mar. 6, 1990) (copy on file at Arizona State Law
Journal). The sponsors of the Senate bill have retreated somewhat to say that "Hawaii and the
territories ought to be able to choose the circuit best suited to their location." Senators Slade
Gorton, Mark 0. Hatfield, and Ted Stevens, Response to Tentative Recommendations of the
Federal Courts Study Committee 1 (Jan. 31, 1990) [hereinafter Response to Tentative Recom-
mendations] (copy on file at Arizona State Law Journal). This would not be enough for Senator
DeConcini, who opposes division generally and has promised that, if the legislation goes forward,
he will "see to it that Arizona and California are not in the same circuit." Hearing on S. 948
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 289 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) [hereinafter Statement of Senator Dennis
DeConcini].
The Senate version will be the first object of analysis because the debate over Senate Bill 948
has developed more fully and, second, because, presumably, the arguments over H.R. 4900 can
be expected to follow similar lines. See 136 CONG. REc. E1700-01 (daily ed. May 24, 1990)
(statements of Reps. Morrison and Craig).
CIRCUIT BOUNDARIES
Series and the Federal Supplement-are the arbitrary products of his-
tory. 2 And the point that this geography-for-lawyers is imaginary, the
fiction of a statute, should not be overlooked.
Congress first drew circuit boundaries in section 4 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, which created the original intermediate tier of federal
courts-three named circuits ("Eastern," "Middle," and "Southern")
geographically encompassing the original thirteen district courts.' The
district courts were exclusively trial courts of limited jurisdiction. The
circuit courts were the principal trial courts, with original jurisdiction
over more serious criminal controversies, diversity suits above a set
figure, and civil cases in which the United States was a party. The
three circuit courts had some appellate jurisdiction to review specified
categories of district court decisions, but the Supreme Court was the
primary appellate court. The circuit courts had no judges of their own;
instead, two Supreme Court justices "rode circuit" to sit with one
district judge as a panel. This enhanced the federalizing influence of
the third branch and was designed to assure uniformity in the national
law. 4 In order to lessen the travel burden on the justices, Congress soon
reconstituted the circuit courts to require a panel of one justice and
one district judge.' Three named circuits became numbered circuits with
the passage of the short-lived "Midnight Judges" Act in 1801.6 The
1801 statute created circuit judgeships enough to reconstitute the circuit
courts as one three-judge panel in each of the six redrawn and numbered
circuits. The repealing statute undid this the next year, but preserved
the numbered circuits, reassigned some states, and further reduced the
circuit court quorum to one district judge sitting alone.7
The technical duty of Supreme Court justices riding circuit obliged
Congress to add to the membership of the Supreme Court and to create
new circuits in order to accommodate westward expansion. A Seventh
2. See T. BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS § 1.03
(Federal Judicial Center Education & Training Series 1989); E. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS 35-60 (1987); Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth
Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687, 688-99 (1981).
3. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74 (current court division at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 81-131 (1988)); see D. HENDERSON, COURTS FOR A NEW NATION 20-29 (1971).
4. See J. GOEBEL, 1 HISTORY OF THE SuPREME COURT-ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO
1801, at 457-508, 552-661 (1971).
5. Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 333 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 42-43 (1988)).
6. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802). See generally Turner, The
Midnight Judges, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 494 (1961).
7. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157, amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1803,
ch. 40, 2 Stat. 244 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1988)).
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Circuit was added for Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee in 1807.1 Reluc-
tant to increase the size of the Supreme Court, however, Congress went
on for a generation without bringing new states into the circuits.
In 1837, Congress acceded to the built-up judicial needs by increasing
the number of justices to nine and by redividing the country into nine
redrawn circuits. 9 Again, some states were reassigned from one circuit
to another. California was included in 1855.10 In 1862, the states that
had been admitted to the Union since the major rearrangement in 1837
were assigned to circuits by enlarging the existing circuits; a Tenth
Circuit and a tenth justice were added in 1863.11 Back then Congress
was quite willing to redraw circuit boundaries to shift a state from one
circuit to another as, for example, when Indiana was moved from the
Seventh Circuit to the Eighth Circuit.12
Again in 1866, Congress rearranged the circuits, reshuffling the states
to draw nine circuits. 3 This statute grouped California, Nevada, and
Oregon in a newly-numbered Ninth Circuit to which Montana, Idaho,
and Washington soon were added.' 4 An 1869 statute created a circuit
judgeship for each circuit and further reduced Supreme Court justice
circuit-riding to a symbolic minimum. 5
The period between 1870 and 1891 has been labeled quite aptly as
"the nadir of federal judicial administration.' '16 Federal dockets grew
8. Act of Feb. 24, 1807, ch. 16, 2 Stat. 420, amended by Act of Mar. 22, 1808, ch. 38, 2
Stat. 477; Act of Feb. 4, 1809, ch. 14, 2 Stat. 516 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
9. Act of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
10. See Act of Mar. 2, 1855, ch. 142, 10 Stat. 631 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
California was constituted a separate circuit by the Act of Mar. 2, 1855, ch. 142, 10 Stat. 631
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)) and, with Oregon, was constituted the Tenth Circuit
by the Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 100, 12 Stat. 794 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
Nevada was added to the Tenth Circuit by the Act of Feb. 24, 1865, ch. 64, 13 Stat. 440 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
11. See Act of July 15, 1862, ch. 178, 12 Stat. 576 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988));
Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 100 12 Stat. 794, amended by Act of Feb. 19, 1864, ch. 11, 13 Stat. 4
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
12. See Act of Jan. 28, 1863, ch. 13, 12 Stat. 637 (amending Act of July 15, 1862, ch. 178,
12 Stat. 576) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
13. See Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 2, 14 Stat. 209 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1988)).
14. See id. Montana was added to the Ninth Circuit by the Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180,
25 Stat 682 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)). Washington was added to the Ninth
Circuit by the Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 2, 25 Stat. 676, 682 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1988)). Idaho was added to the Ninth Circuit by the Act of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, § 16, 26
Stat. 215, 217 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
15. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 43 (1988)).
This act also restored the Supreme Court bench to nine seats.
16. Baker, supra note 2, at 692 (quoting P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MismN, D. SHi'mo,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 37 (3d ed. 1988)).
CIRCUIT BOUNDARIES
dramatically as a result of geographical expansion, population growth,
commercial development, and congressional extensions of jurisdiction.
The federal courts were hard-pressed to keep up. When congressional
reformers could not agree on what to do, nothing was done and matters
worsened: "The federal judicial system, ill-equipped to handle the pre-
Civil War demands on its resources, nearly ground to a halt during
this post-war period, buried in work.' 7 The country's western vastness
had made circuit-riding wholly unfeasible. A complement of ten circuit
judges, one in each numbered circuit, 8 could not realistically supervise
the growing number of district courts, which by then had reached sixty-
five districts. An appeal from a district court to a circuit court "panel"
of one district judge was viewed practically as a waste of time. The
number of appeals exceeded the system's capacity for appellate review. 19
With the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, popularly known as
the Evarts Act, Congress made the most significant structural change
since the creation of the federal courts. 2° The statute created a new
court-the circuit court of appeals-for each of the nine circuits. Each
court was comprised of two circuit judges (a second judgeship was
added in each circuit) and either one circuit justice or one district
judge. The original circuit court continued as a trial court, but its
whole appellate jurisdiction was transferred to the new circuit court of
appeals. A second appeal as of right to the Supreme Court from the
circuit court of appeals was limited by subject matter and jurisdictional
amount. In the remaining cases, the circuit court of appeals was
reviewed only with discretionary leave of the Supreme Court. The
anachronistic circuit courts were finally abolished and their remnant
original jurisdiction was transferred to the district courts in 1911.21
During this period, the modern Ninth Circuit took shape with the
addition of Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, and Guam. 22 The national struc-
17. Id.
18. In 1887, a tenth circuit judge was added to sit on the second circuit. Act of Mar. 3,
1887, ch. 347, 24 Stat. 492 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1988)).
19. See Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38 S.C.L. RIv.
411, 413-16 (1987).
20. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49 (1988)).
See generally F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SuPREME COURT, A STUDY IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 103-28 (1928).
21. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 132
(1988)).
22. Hawaii was included in the Ninth Circuit by the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat.
1087, 1131 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)). Arizona was included in the Ninth Circuit
by the Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
Alaska district court decisions were made reviewable in the Ninth Circuit by the Act of Feb. 13,
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ture became more stable in 1925 when Congress dramatically expanded
the Supreme Court's discretion over its docket. 23 This design contem-
plates the district court for trial to resolve disputes, the court of appeals
for the appeal as of right to correct error, and the Supreme Court for
the discretionary final review to establish a uniform national law.
Even after the structure and functions of the modern federal courts
stabilized, Congress continued to redraw circuit boundaries. In 1929,
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was added to the nine
circuits created by the Evarts Act by detaching six states from the
Eighth Circuit. 24 Those two circuits have remained geographically con-
stant since then. In 1948, Congress formally added the District of
Columbia Circuit. 25 The Judicial Code of that same year renamed the
circuit courts of appeals as the "United States Court of Appeals" for
the (numbered/named) Circuit. 26 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit was created in 1980 by cleaving Alabama, Florida, and Georgia
from the former Fifth Circuit to leave Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas
in the new Fifth Circuit.2 7 And two years later, Congress added a new
circuit to the list, the Federal Circuit, which represents a, notable
experiment with a national boundary and appellate subject matter
jurisdiction.28 Thus, over two centuries Congress has demonstrated a
ready willingness to redraw circuit boundaries and to reassign states to
existing or newly created circuits. Viewed historically, these boundary
lines, far from being chiseled in stone, appear to be quite evanescent.
Viewed functionally, these incidents of redrawing may be recognized as
a frequent exercise of the congressional power to "from time to time
1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)). Guam was added to the
Ninth Circuit by the Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, 65 Stat. 710, 723 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 41 (1988)).
23. See Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1254 (1988)); see also Supreme Court Case Selection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat.
662 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988)).
24. See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1347 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
41 (1988)); see infra text accompanying notes 30-36.
25. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 41, 62 Stat. 869, 870 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
41 (1988)).
26. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2680, 62 Stat. 869, 985 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 43 (1988)); see C. WmiorT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 3, at 10 (4th ed. 1983).
27. Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1988)); see infra text accompanying notes 37-56.
28. Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1988)). See generally Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 1 (1989); Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An
Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761 (1983);
Note, An Appraisal of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 57 S. CAL. L. Rav. 301
(1984).
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ordain and establish" the "inferior courts" of the United States.2 9
III. DIVDING COURTS OF APPEALS
During the modern period, Congress twice has divided existing circuits
into two new circuits: in 1929 to separate the new Tenth Circuit from
the Eighth Circuit, and in 1981 to separate the new Eleventh Circuit
from the Fifth Circuit. The attendant circumstances surrounding these
divisions and the new courts' experiences since should help to inform
the contemporary debate over whether to separate a new Twelfth Circuit
from the Ninth Circuit, the proposal in Senate Bill 948.
In 1925, efforts to alleviate the congestion in the circuit dockets
centered on the Eighth Circuit.3 0 That court then covered thirteen states
from Minnesota in the north to New Mexico in the south and from
Iowa in the east to Utah in the west. In 1927, an ABA committee,
without the formal endorsement of the ABA, proposed to redraw all
the existing circuit boundaries and in the process create a new Tenth
Circuit to include Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Or-
egon, Utah, and Washington." The opposition to the proposal proved
diverse and effective. Opponents complained chiefly about switching
states from one circuit to another and the consequent changes in the
law, although buttressing arguments were heard: that the workload in
the Eighth Circuit did not justify a division, that the bill would not
adequately address the docket problem because it failed to create new
judgeships, and that the one-to-one ratio of circuits to justices on the
Supreme Court should not be abandoned.12 After that, Chief Justice
Taft, exercising characteristic leadership, suggested that Congress could
divide the Eighth Circuit and let alone all the others.33 Members of the
bar and the judges on the Eighth Circuit supported this proposal and,
after debating various bills to divide the court in different ways,
Congress passed a statute in 1929 dividing the court and creating two
new judgeships.34
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("inferior" is the term in article III); see E. CHEhmRiNsKy,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 1.1, at 3 (1989).
30. See Stanley & Russell, The Political and Administrative History of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 60 DEN. L.J. 119, 124-28 (1983).
31. Id. at 124 (citing D. BONN, TFm GEOGRAPHICAL DrVISIoN OF THE EiorTH Cntcurr COURT
OF APPAL.S 4 (1974) (research report written for the Federal Judicial Center)).
32. Id. at 124-28.
33. Hearings on H.R. 5690, H.R. 13567, and H.R. 13757 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1929) (testimony of Chief Justice Taft).
34. Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, § 1, 45 Stat. 1346, 1346-47 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1988)).
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Since then, the Eighth Circuit has included Arkansas, Iowa, Minne-
sota, North Dakota, and South Dakota, and the Tenth Circuit has
included Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyom-
ing.35 Since 1929, active judgeships have increased in the Eighth Circuit
from five to ten and in the Tenth Circuit from four to ten. The dockets
of the courts of appeals in 1929, the year of the division, have so little
in common with contemporary dockets in size or in scope, however,
that a comparison is not very helpful. These two courts of appeals
today are typical in that increased staff and procedural innovations
continue to keep them afloat.3 6 What is interesting is the noted reluc-
tance to redraw all the circuit boundaries and the congressional strategy
to focus, instead, on dividing one large "problem" circuit. The same
strategy was espoused again and was explained further in 1973 by the
so-called "Hruska Commission":
We have not recommended a general realignment of all the circuits.
To be sure, the present boundaries are largely the result of historical
accident and do not satisfy such criteria as parity of caseloads and
geographical compactness. But these boundaries have stood since
the nineteenth century, except for the creation of the Tenth Circuit
in 1929, and whatever the actual extent of variation in the law from
circuit to circuit, relocation would take from the bench and bar at
least some of the law now familiar to them. Moreover, the Com-
mission has heard eloquent testimony evidencing the sense of com-
munity shared by lawyers and judges within the present circuits.
Except for the most compelling reasons, we are reluctant to disturb
institutions which have acquired not only the respect but also the
loyalty of their constituents."
That comprehensive study recommended, instead of a national recon-
figuration, that Congress divide the two largest courts of appeals-the
35. The Tenth Circuit is a candidate for a question of "federal jurisdiction trivial pursuit."
Because the District of Wyoming includes all of that state and such portions of Yellowstone
National Park as are within Montana and Idaho, the Tenth Circuit contains areas outside the six
listed states. 28 U.S.C. § 131 (1988); see C. WRiGHT, supra note 26, § 2, at 8 n.3. An even more
obscure provision, perhaps a "daily double" question, is the Ninth Circuit's statutory mandate
to decide issues arising out of the Snake River Watershed via the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1988). 9TH Cm. R. 15-2.1. This gets the
Ninth Circuit into Wyoming, a Tenth Circuit state, as far as Jackson Lake. See generally Hellman,
Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1188
(1974).
36. See Baker, A Compendium of Proposals To Reform the United States Courts of Appeals,
37 U. FiA. L. REv. 225, 273-74 (1985).
37. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical
Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223, 228
(1973) [hereinafter Commission on Revision].
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Fifth Circuit, which has happened, and the Ninth Circuit, which is
being considered anew.
Nearer in time and more similar in complexity than the division of
the Eighth Circuit, the division of the Fifth Circuit is the most signif-
icant legislative precedent for the current debate over dividing the Ninth
Circuit. One could write a book about the story of the division of the
Fifth Circuit, and it would tell an involved story of judicial politics."
The docket problems of the Fifth Circuit first became a concern two
decades before Congress moved to divide.3 9 In 1964, an ad hoc com-
mittee of the Judicial Conference of the United States recommended a
division of the Fifth Circuit into a new fifth circuit composed of
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi, and a new eleventh circuit
composed of Louisiana, Texas, and the Canal Zone.4 Congress added
four temporary judgeships to the Fifth Circuit in 1966, and in 1968
made those judgeships permanent and added two more, increasing the
total to fifteen judges. 41 Between 1950 and the mid-1970s, the filings
in the Fifth Circuit multiplied by a factor of nine42 and "Congress
simply could not add judges fast enough." ' 4a The court survived by
exceeding norms of productivity and by implementing intramural pro-
cedural reforms that cumulatively transformed the intermediate appel-
late court."
Responding to the urgings of Chief Justice Burger and others, Con-
gress created the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Ap-
pellate System, the so-called Hruska Commission. 45 After extensive
hearings, the Hruska Commission recommended in 1973 that Congress
divide the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit. The states of the Fifth
Circuit were to be grouped in two new circuits: Alabama, Florida, and
Georgia in one circuit, and Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas in another
38. See generally D. BARRow & T. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED-THE FIrT CmcuIT COURT
OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988); H. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH
CmcUrr 1891-1981 184-98 (1984); Baker, supra note 2, at 696-705.
39. See generally Wahl, The Case for an Eleventh Court of Appeals, 24 FLA. L.J. 233 (1950);
Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEx. L. REv. 949
(1964).
40. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 88th Cong., 20 Sess. 14-15 (1964).
41. Act of Mar. 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-372, § 1, 80 Stat. 75 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 44
(1988)); Act of June 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-347, § 2, 82 Stat. 184 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 44
(1988)).
42. Gee, The Imminent Destruction of the Fifth Circuit: Or, How Not To Deal with a
Blossoming Docket, 9 TEX. TECH L. REv. 799, 799 (1978).
43. Baker, supra note 2, at 697.
44. See generally Baker, supra note 36, at 243-74.
45. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (1973).
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circuit. .The Commission also proposed two alternative realignments:
(A) grouping Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi in one circuit
and grouping Arkansas (from the Eighth Circuit), Louisiana, and Texas
in another circuit; or (B) grouping Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and
Missigsippi in one circuit and grouping Louisiana and Texas in another
circuit.
This recommendation and these two alternatives satisfied most of the
general criteria for realignment that the Commission established: (1)
circuits would be composed of at least three states; (2) no circuit should
be created that would immediately require more than nine judges; (3)
a circuit should contain states with a diversity of legal business, socio-
economic interests, and population; (4) realignment should avoid ex-
cessive interference with established circuit boundaries; and (5) no circuit
should contain noncontiguous states." Bills were introduced in Congress
tracking each of the three proposed divisions, 47 but a compromise
measure, seemingly unsatisfactory to everyone, emerged: to reorganize
the Fifth Circuit into two internal divisions, each with its own chief
judge, clerk, circuit executive, and judicial council.4 Objections voiced
against the creation of two new courts ranged from the ridiculous to
the sublime: a concern over which new court would bear the name
Fifth; resistance to grouping Mississippi with the civil law state of
Louisiana and with Texas; a worry about creating an oil and gas circuit
dominated by Louisiana and Texas; and reverence for the history and
tradition of the Fifth Circuit. The matter stalled.
In 1978, Congress tried again. A bill passed the Senate that would
have added long overdue judgeships and would have created two
separate circuits: a new Fifth Circuit comprised of Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Mississippi, and the Canal Zone, and a new Eleventh Circuit
comprised of Louisiana and Texas. 49 The House passed a bill that would
have increased the number of judgeships, but would not have divided
the court.5 0 The conference committee had a difficult time of it: the
Senate's bill would have violated two criteria of the Hruska Commission
to create a two-state circuit and to create two new courts each with
more than nine judges. The civil rights industry opposed creating the
proposed Fifth Circuit with; as-perceived, more conservative, deep-
46. Commission on Revision, supra note 37, at 231-32.
47. S. 2988-2990, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 2609, 2609-11 (1974); see 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ArnmN. NEws 3569, 3601-05.
48.: S. REP. No. 117, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
News 3569, 3604.
49. S. 11, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNo. REc. 16,405-07 (1977).
50. H.R. 7843, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CoNo. REC. 2443-44 (1978).
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south judges, and the worry was raised again that the proposed eleventh
circuit eventually would become little more than an oil and gas subject
matter court. With the important nationwide patronage of more than
150 new judgeships providing the "will," however, Congress found the
"way" to compromise in 1978. The Fifth Circuit was increased to
twenty-six judges and the statute authorized any court of appeals with
more than fifteen active judges (the Ninth Circuit was the only other)
to constitute itself into administrative units and to adopt a rule to
perform the en banc function with fewer than all its members.5'
Congress had added judges and had left the problem with them. 52
The Fifth Circuit Judicial Council followed the congressional lead
and appointed a committee to study the feasibility of an internal
reorganization into administrative units and to propose an en banc
procedure. After much debate and deliberation, in May 1980, the Fifth
Circuit Judicial Council arranged the court into two administrative
units: Unit A, composed of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, and
Unit B, composed of Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. The unities of
the en banc court and the judicial council were maintained. But signif-
icantly, the judicial council for the first time unanimously petitioned
Congress to divide the court into two autonomous circuits.53 Congress
found this judicial unanimity compelling and, when numerous bar
associations and other organizations supported the measure and when
more general opposition from civil rights groups and others fell away,
the former Fifth Circuit was divided. 54
Congress divided the former Fifth Circuit essentially because of its
largeness-in geography, population, docket, and judgeships. Redraw-
ing the circuit boundaries, however, did absolutely nothing to relieve
the press of the caseload. The new Fifth Circuit reached the pre-division
51. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 46 (1988); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1643, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADbN?. NEws 3618, 3618. See generally infra text accompanying notes
57-75.
52. See Gee, supra note 42, at 813; Morgan, The Fifth Circuit: Expand or Divide?, 29
MERCER L. Rav. 885, 895 (1978); Reavley, The Split of the Fifth Circuit: Update and Finis, 12
TEx. TECH L. Rav. 1, 4 (1981).
53. See Reavley, supra note 52, at 5-7; see also Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 642
(1990) (statement of Gilbert F. Ganucheau).
54. Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 41
(1988)); see generally H.R. REp. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADhaN. NEWS 4236; Hearing on H.R. 6060, H.R. 7665, and Related Bills Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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crisis level of filings in less than five years." The Eleventh Circuit
Judicial Council reached the point of passing a formal and unanimous
resolution last March asking Congress not to add any more circuit
judgeships, despite statistical-caseload justifications, because that court
of appeals simply would grow too large . 6
IV. THE CURRENT PROPOSAL To DIVIDE THE NINTI CIRCUIT
A. Background
Proposals to divide the Ninth Circuit have circulated since before
World War II, and it was no surprise in 1973 that the Hruska Com-
mission recommended it be divided, along with the Fifth Circuit.57 What
was surprising was the Commission's proposal to carve up California
and reassign district courts in the same state to different circuits.5 s That
was enough to quiet the matter for then, although the idea has been
persistent: The last bill to divide the Ninth Circuit went nowhere in
1983.19
55. Speech by Gilbert Ganucheau, Fifth Circuit Appellate Advocacy Seminar (Oct. 18, 1984),
reprinted in 2 Fifth Circuit Rep. 301 (1985).
Last May, Chief Judge Charles Clark of the Fifth Circuit chronicled the region's relentless
docket growth:
Since this is a joint conference [of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits], I thought it
may be interesting to compare where the circuits began in 1981 and where they are
now. In the district courts, pending civil cases in the 5th Circuit increased 60% since
1981. They presently total 36,871. In the l1th Circuit, the increase has been 48o
and the present total is 19,530. Criminal cases in the district courts in the fifth
Circuit have increased by an astounding 28007o to the present total of 4,343. The
l1th Circuit criminal case increase has been almost as dramatic: 188%. Pending
criminal cases now total 3,539 pending cases. Pending bankruptcy cases in the 5th
Circuit increased 1080o to their present level of just over 100,000, while the 1lth
Circuit's pending bankruptcy cases increased 790o to the present-day total of 93,514.
In the Courts of Appeals, pending cases in the Fifth rose by 35% to the present
total of 2,955, while the 1lth Circuit experienced a 44% increase in pending cases
to a total of 3,171.
Chief Judge Charles Clark, Remarks at the 1989 Judicial Conference of the Fifth and Eleventh
Judicial Circuits in New Orleans, La. (May 8, 1989).
56. Chief Judge Paul H. Roney, Remarks at the 1989 Judicial Conference of the Fifth and
Eleventh Judicial Circuits in New Orleans, La. (May 8, 1989); Letter from Chief Judge Paul H.
Roney to Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts. (Mar. 2, 1989).
57. Commission on Revision, supra note 37, at 234-35; see supra text accompanying notes
45-48.
58. See generally Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial
Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1188 (1974).
59. S. 1156, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Circuit Breaker-Move on to Split the Ninth, 70
A.B.A. J. 34, 34 (1984).
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In 1978, Congress authorized courts of appeals with more than fifteen
active judges to reorganize into administrative units and to streamline
the en banc hearing procedure.60 The Ninth Circuit has accepted Con-
gress' invitation to innovate in numerous ways .6
The court reorganized itself internally into three administrative units
to allow for a more decentralized and more efficient administration.
The most senior active judge acts as the administrative judge for each
unit. The chief judge, 62 the three administrative judges, and five active
judges drawn by lot from among those willing to serve, constitute an
executive committee,which is authorized to act between court meetings
in emergencies and on lesser matters. The committee's chief function
is to review proposals on operating procedures and to make recom-
mendations to the full court.63 There is the argument that "[slooner or
later, the Ninth Circuit will be divided, either by Act of Congress or
on a de facto basis by the creation of regional administrative units
within the circuit.'"' Even conceding that division is best accomplished
by statute, the Ninth Circuit's administrative arrangement is far from
a de facto division. Besides, my ultimate position is not that the court
never be divided but the more short term argument that it not be
divided now.
By circuit rule, as authorized by Congress, the court has adopted a
limited en banc court procedure. 6 The chief judge and the ten active
60. The authorization reads:
Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute itself into
administrative units complete with such facilities and staff as may be prescribed by
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and may perform its en banc
function by such number of members of its en banc courts as may be prescribed by
rule of the court of appeals.
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, supplemented by Act of
Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1981); see also supra text accompanying note
51.
61. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NnTn CnRcurr,
FOURTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 6 OF THE OMNIBUS
JUDGESHIPS ACT OF 1978 AND OTHER MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN
TH NINTH CIRCUIT 1 (July 1989) (copy on file at Arizona State Law Journal) [hereinafter Fourth
Biennial Report to Congress]; see also J. CECI, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE
COURT: THm NINTH CIRcUT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985).
62. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 45, 136 (1988).
63. Lateef, Justice on Appeal; A Proposal, Los Angeles Daily Journal Rep., Sept. 29, 1989,
at 6, 10.
64. Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 250-51 (1990) (testimony of Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield)
[hereinafter Testimony of Senator Hatfield).
65. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (formerly Rule 25). See generally Bennett & Pembroke, "Mini" In
Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 531 (1986).
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judges chosen by lot sit on each en banc panel; however, an en banc
rehearing is granted only on the vote of a majority of all active judges.
Retired Chief Justice Burger seems to think this is a practice that will
not work in theory. 6 Critics of the limited en banc complain that the
device is expensive and time-consuming without being effective to
maintain a unity in the law of the circuit. The "luck of the draw"
selection procedure in particular weakens allegiance to the en banc
holdings and makes the reconciliation of precedents even less likely. 67
Based on its institutional experierice, the Department of Justice has
concluded that the Ninth Circuit judges themselves have "a strong
aversion to using even this limited en banc procedure." It is common
for the judges not to vote on petitions for en banc rehearing-on
average only nine cases are reheard en banc each year-and the "super-
en banc" convening all twenty-eight judges, though still possible, has
never once been held.69 Necessarily part of this reluctance is due to the
unwieldy nature of any en banc rehearing, in costs and delay. These
rehearings are judicial-labor intensive, requiring consideration of mo-
tions for rehearing, convening, and conferencing, and building and
maintaining a more complicated consensus. Besides the workload, there
66. - This was his main objection to retaining the current boundary:
Now calling that panel of eleven judges an en banc hearing is what the modem-day
law students call an oxymoron. It is a horrible word-an inherent contradiction. It
isn't an en banc hearing at all. If you take the very words "en banc," French or
English, it means all of the judges involved. And, of course, the Ninth Circuit
judges saw from the experience of the Fifth Circuit that they had to do something.
I don't think there is an en banc procedure in the Ninth Circuit at all. An en
banc procedure would be every judge who, under the law, by virtue of active service,
is entitled to a vote.
Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess 468 (1990) (testimony of Retired Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger) [hereinafter Testimony of Retired Chief Justice Warren E. Burger] (emphasis added); see
supra note 60.
67. Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess 275 (1990) (statement of Sen. Conrad Burns)
[hereinafter Statement of Senator Conrad Burns]; Response to Tentative Recommendations, supra
note 1, at 11.
68. Letter from Bruce C. Navarro, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice, to Sen. Howell Heflin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice, Comm.
on the Judiciary 5 (Mar. 6, 1990) (copy on file at Arizona State Law Journal) [hereinafter Letter
from Bruce C. Navarro].
69. Position paper of Senator Slade Gorton on the "Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Reorganization Act of 1989" (S. 948) 7 (Mar. 6, 1990) (copy on file at Arizona State Law
Journal) [hereinafter Position Paper of Senator Slade Gorton]; Statement of Senator Conrad
Bums, supra note 67, at 276.
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is the not yet completely fantastic expectation that the Supreme Court
will grant review.
These are telling criticisms. First, I too am skeptical of the continued
efficacy of the en banc mechanisms in general, in the Ninth Circuit
and in other courts of appeals. 7° The procedure is costly in terms of
judicial resources. Today's larger courts with their expansive dockets
do not seem to be as manageable by an en banc majority policing for
consistency among three-judge panels. Often a year's delay results only
in a fragmented series of opinions that do not provide an authoritative
resolution of an issue of law of the circuit. Second, there are further-
compromises attendant on the limited en banc procedure with fewer
than all judges. The raison d'tre of the en banc court is to establish
the law of the circuit by a majority of all the judges, not by a simple
majority of a subset of judges randomly chosen, whose decision may
not be representative. But these shortcomings have been traded off
against the wholly unworkable concept of a hearing panel with twenty-
eight members. 7' After all, these trade-offs were made first by Congress
in the controlling statutory provision and then by the Ninth Circuit.
The court hardly can be faulted for choosing a legislated option and
avoiding the demonstrated problems of the other choice. 72 Concern for
the necessary evil of limited en banc participation may be allayed
somewhat by the testimonials of some judicial participants. For example
Judge Clifford Wallace has observed:
Having sat on seven of these limited en banc cases, my impressions
are positive. The critical question is whether each judge of the court
of appeals will conclude that he or she need not vote on every en
banc case. From my own observations, I sense a different climate
when the selected judges represent the court. En bancs under the
traditional system often centered around attempts by the author of
the panel opinion to justify his or her position, in the face of
repeated attacks by the panel dissenter. Now, only by chance is a
member of the panel on the en banc court, and, so far, I have not
witnessed any great defensiveness. 71
70. See Baker, supra note 36, at 291-92.
71. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 38-44 (discussing docket problems in the Fifth Circuit).
72. But see Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess 559 (1990) (statement of Mark C. Rutzick)
[hereinafter Statement of Mark C. Rutzick].
73. Address by Judge J. Clifford Wallace at the Univ. of Cal. Law School at Berkeley (Dec.
2, 1982), reprinted in Lateef, supra note 63, at 9 (Judge Wallace succeeded Judge Goodwin as
Chief Judge after this article was written).
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From the point of view of lawyers and litigants, one might suppose a
six-five decision by a limited en banc court to be as trustworthy a
precedential datum as a five-four decision by the Supreme Court. 74
Finally, the report of the Federal Courts Study Committee is persuasive:
It recommends that the limited en banc mechanism actually be extended
to other courts "to allow more efficient use of court of appeals resources
... [since] [tihe growth in the number of circuit judges is likely to
continue, increasing the potential for in banc courts of unwieldy size. ' 75
The Ninth Circuit judges also have increased their judicial output
and have adopted a number of intramural reforms, including a sub-
mission-without-oral-argument track for more straightforward appeals
and a prebriefing conference program to narrow issues, shorten briefs,
and encourage settlements. The role of support staff has been made
more efficient. 76 The Ninth Circuit likewise has been a leader in judicial
utilization of advances in technology in such areas as electronic mall
and computerized case management. 77
In their most recent biennial report to Congress, the judges of the
Ninth Circuit have concluded that their experiment is over and may be
deemed a success.7 8 The first report in 1982 described the planned
changes. The second report in 1984 noted progress and acknowledged
problems. The third report in 1986 concluded that a large court could
dispose of a huge caseload effectively. The fourth report in 1989
carefully documents the judges' conclusion that there is no reason to
divide their court. Indeed, the judges seem confident that "the inno-
vations of the past decade provide a solid foundation for the continued
growth of the Ninth Circuit." ' 79
B. Senate Bill 948
Senate Bill 948, currently before the Courts and Administrative
Practice Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, seems to
74. Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess 692 (1990) (statement of Eric Redman) [hereinafter
Statement of Eric Redman].
75. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., 101ST CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT 115 (Apr. 2, 1990)
[hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY Coman rEE REPORT].
76. But see Position Paper of Senator Slade Gorton, supra note 69, at 8 (critical of
"bureaucratic procedures").
77. See generally Catterson, The Changing Ninth Circuit, 21 ARIz. ST. L.J. 173 (1989);
Wasby, Technology and Communication in a Federal Court: The Ninth Circuit, 28 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 1 (1988).
78. Fourth Biennial Report to Congress, supra note 61, at 71.
79. Id. (emphasis added). These studies and reports are often highly persuasive with members
of Congress; see Statement of Senator Dennis DeConcini, supra note 1, at 288.
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have a good chance of overcoming the judges' conclusion.8o Introduced
by senators from the Northwest, the redrawn boundaries would leave
Arizona, California, and Nevada in a new Ninth Circuit, and would
transfer Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, Guam,
and the Northern Mariana Islands to a new Twelfth Circuit.8 ' This is
not just some warning shot fired by Senator Gorton on behalf of the
Pacific Northwest. Although efforts to divide have been cyclical, this
is the most credible effort yet, as eight senators have joined as co-
sponsors.12 In something of a surprise move, the Department of Justice
has endorsed the measure, after having taken an official "no position"
during earlier consideration. 3 On March 6, 1990, a full-scale hearing
was held before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Prac-
tice of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and a full schedule of witnesses
gave lengthy and serious testimony, some in favor and some opposed
to the measure. Five senators from affected states have gone on record
as opposed to division.8 Senator DeConcini, the only member of the
Judiciary Committee to testify, opposed the bill. Other members of the
committee, including Senator Joseph R. Biden, who chairs the com-
mittee, and Senator Howell T. Heflin, who chairs the subcommittee,
have not yet declared their positions.
While the assertion by former Chief Judge Goodwin of the Ninth
Circuit seems correct, that this proposal is "blatantly political, ' 85 most
all issues having to do with federal courts are political. Ultimately,
federal jurisdiction is politics. Furthermore, in public debates with
Congress over the administration of the courts, "federal judges in the
United States are by nature and necessity politicians. "86 Published news
80. See Hatfield, Time for a New Federal Circuit in the West: Why the Ninth Circuit Should
Be Divided, OR. ST. B. BULL., Jan. 1990, at 6, 7. But see Goodwin, Splitting the Ninth Circuit-
No Answer to Caseload Growth, OR. ST. B. BULL., Jan. 1990, at 10, 11.
81. S. 948, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
82. Original sponsors included Senators Burns (Mont.), Gorton (Wash.), Hatfield (Or.),
Packwood (Or.), McClure (Idaho), Murkowski (Ala.), and Stevens (Ala.). See generally 135 CONG.
REc. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statements of Introduction). Senator Symms (Idaho) and
Senator Baucus (Mont.) later were added as cosponsors. See 135 CONG. REc. S5847 (daily ed.
May 31, 1989); 135 CoNG. REc. S5198 (daily ed. May 11, 1989).
83. Letter from Bruce C. Navarro, supra note 68. But see generally infra note 198 (statement
of Attorney General Richard Thornburgh).
84. See generally Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (statements of Senators Alan
Cranston, Dennis DeConcini, Daniel K. Inouye, and Pete Wilson).
85. Trigoboff, Northwest Favors Splitting 'California' Circuit, Legal Times, June 12, 1989,
at 2, col. 1 (quoting former Chief Judge Alfred Goodwin). In a later interview, former Chief
Judge Goodwin said he no longer felt it appropriate to comment on the motivation of the
measure's sponsors. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1990, at B6, col. 3.
86. D. BARRow & T. WALKER, supra note 38, at ix.
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accounts suggest that this bill is the latest round in "a long running
fight between the Northwest's pro-growth developers and the environ-
mentalists. ' 87 The point is that proponents of division are serious and
committed and this bill deserves careful analysis.
One would suppose that those who would redraw circuit boundaries
would bear the burden of persuasion, a burden which has gone unmet
so far in the consideration of Senate Bill 948. In their formal responses,
those who oppose the bill have persuasively rebutted the allegations of
the Senate sponsors. 88
1. Size
Senator Gorton, who has lead the effort to divide the Ninth Circuit,
deems the size of the circuit to be a problem in and of itself, just as
the size of the former Fifth Circuit was a problem. 89 He concludes:
In a nutshell: the Ninth Circuit is simply too large. This huge circuit
requires too much travel, and has too many judges handing down
too many opinions that breed inconsistency and lack of uniformity,
and require judges and lawyers too much reading, in too little time,
encouraging frivolous lawsuits and overburdening the court calen-
87. Trigoboff, supra note 85, at 2, col. 1. The alleged political motive is to overcome the
so-called California-judge dominance of the Ninth Circuit, which lately has delivered too many
"decisions-frequently reversals of district judges in Washington and Oregon-favoring such
plaintiffs as Save the Yaak (a river in Montana) and Friends of the Earth. Often the defendants
are governmental agencies cooperating with private concerns attempting to develop or draw
resources from public lands." Id. at 2, 15; see, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d
302, 303 (9th Cir. 1989). The popular press also figures that the Ninth Circuit's decisions to stay
state executions of various murderers from Washington and Montana have contributed to a
regional hostility toward the court. Murphy, Critics say 9th Circuit Is Too Big for the Job, Seek
To Secede, L.A. Times, June 27, 1989, at 3; see, e.g. Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453,
1457 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming the denial of relief, but after a stay pending appeal). See generally
Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on ,Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (statement of Kenneth 0. Eikenberry) [hereinafter
Statement of Kenneth 0. Eikenberry]. The debate has become personal on both sides. Senator
Gorton has responded: "As expected, this bill has been taken personally by the Ninth Circuit
hierarchy-God bless their souls-who has set out to defeat this bill and protect their power
base." Position Paper of Senator Slade Gorton, supra note 69, at 5.
88. See generally Position Paper Prepared by the Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the
Ninth Circuit (1989) (copy on file at Arizona State Law Journal) [hereinafter Position Paper of
the Circuit Executive]. The 1989 Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference recommended that Congress
reject any proposal to divide the court, and an overwhelming number of the circuit's active judges
oppose division. Hearing scheduled on Ninth Circuit Split, 22 THE TIRD BwAcH 3 (1990).
89. 135 CONG. REc. S5026 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Gorton); see also
Statement of Senator Conrad Burns, supra note 67; Testimony of Senator Hatfield, supra note
64.
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dar, which costs the public too much money and delivers too slowly,
too little justice. 90
The Ninth Circuit covers nine states and two territories totaling ap-
proximately fourteen million square miles. Distances and expenses for
lawyers are greater as a result. 9' Travel expenses for the Ninth Circuit
are the highest in the federal courts. But any circuit with Alaska will
be the largest geographically. A typical panel sitting away from cham-
bers usually involves only two hours travel time each way for a twenty
to thirty hour stint on the bench.Y
The Ninth Circuit serves a population of almost forty-four million
people, fifteen million more than the next argest, the Sixth Circuit,
and about twenty million more than all the other courts of appeals. 93
This is roughly one-sixth of the nation's population, the approximate
proportion in the old Eighth Circuit when Congress divided it in 1929.9
But nearly any conceivable circuit with California will be among the
largest in population.
With twenty-eight judgeships, the Ninth Circuit has twelve more than
the next largest, the Fifth Circuit, and sixteen more than the average
of the other circuits. The Ninth Circuit courts are staffed by twenty-
eight circuit judges, eleven senior circuit judges, eighty-seven district
judges, forty senior district judges, and sixty-two active plus eight
recalled bankruptcy judges. By the estimate of Senator Gorton, as many
as ten additional circuit judgeships are justified by the standard caseload
formula, which would mean thirty-eight appellate judges. 95 In the
abstract, size may be viewed as an asset. The bench is enriched by
diversity, and there is a flexibility in the court of appeals and in the
district court to shift judges around to meet episodic needs. The most
recent experience has been to the benefit of the Pacific Northwest and
particularly Washington. During 1988 alone, forty-two assignments of
judges were made from districts in the proposed new Ninth Circuit to
90. Position Paper of Senator Slade Gorton, supra note 69, at 1; see also Letter from Bruce
C. Navarro, supra note 68, at 3-5.
91. Lawyers and litigants from the large cities in the Pacific Northwest often are obliged to
travel 600-1000 miles, at about that dollar cost, to San Francisco sittings. Statement of Mark C.
Rutzick, supra note 72, at 8.
92. Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 315 (1990) (statement of former Chief Judge
Alfred T. Goodwin) [hereinafter Statement of former Chief Judge Alfred T. Goodwin].
93. Population estimates indicate an increase of 17% over the 1980 census. Letter from Bruce
C. Navarro, supra note 68, at 4.
94. Statement of Mark C. Rutzick, supra note 72, at 8.
95. Position Paper of Senator Slade Gorton, supra note 69, at 2.
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districts in the proposed Twelfth Circuit.9 Maintaining the Ninth Circuit
to allow such transfers, however, is not preferable to the forthright
solution of appointing the number of judges that are needed in the
burdened districts 7
The Ninth Circuit's caseload of more than 6000 appeals is 2000 larger
than the next largest court of appeals and accounts for nearly one-sixth
of the total appeals in all the twelve regional courts of appeals. 98
Projections promise an even more Brobdignagian docket as the current
rate of growth would double the 1980 docket well before the year 2000.
In calendar year 1988, the Ninth Circuit terminated 6170 appeals, 17.7%
more than the previous year.9 Despite three unfilled vacancies, the
court's calendar is current: Once an appeaJ is fully briefed by counsel,
it is scheduled for the next argument calendar.100 Statistics should not
be the final word, however, for they are too often difficult to assess
meaningfully. Increases in quantity and in the complexity of appeals
have come to be a given in the federal system. Intuitively, we might
assume that division would ameliorate somewhat the burden on district
judges and attorneys to keep up with the law of the circuit. 10'
One sponsor noted that 14.5 months was the median time the Ninth
Circuit took to process an appeal, the longest in the nation.102 Of that
period, however, only a fraction is spent in judges' chambers, from
submission to disposition: 2.5 months for orally argued cases and 0.9
96. Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 503 (1990) (statement of Irwin H. Schwartz)
[herienafter Statement of Irwin H. Schwartz).
97. Letter from Edward F. Shea, Washington State Bar Ass'n, to Senator Strom Thurmond,
Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice 2 (Apr. 25, 1990) [hereinafter Letter
from Edward F. Shea].
The number of bankruptcy judges has allowed the Ninth Circuit to be an important leader in
bankruptcy appellate panels. Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin.
Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 457-62 (1990) (statement
of Thomas E. Carlson, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge) [hereinafter Statement of Thomas E. Carlson].
See generally Sloan & Bermont, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels: The Ninth Circuit's Experience, 21
ARIz. ST. L.J. 181 (1989). The Federal Courts Study Committee held up this example to Congress
and the other circuits. FEDERAL CouRTs SnTuy Comtrrrs REPORT, supra note 75, at 74-76.
98. Letter from Bruce C. Navarro, supra note 68, at 4.
99. Position Paper of the Circuit Exccutive, supra note 88, at 4.
100. Id. at 3.
101. Position Paper of Senator Slade Gorton, supra note 69, at 3; Letter from Edward F.
Shea, supra note 97, at 2; Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative
Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 708 (1990) (statement of
Judge Eugene A. Wright) [hereinafter Statement of Judge Eugene A. Wright].
102. 135 CONG. REc. S5027 (daily ed..May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Burns); see also
Position Paper of Senator Slade Gorton, supra note 69, at 3 (15.3 months as of June 30, 1989).
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months for submitted cases. These figures are less than the national
average.'03 The remainder of the 14.5 months is spent by court reporters
and attorneys in record preparation and briefing. Still this is a troubling
statistic, for half the appeals take longer than two years. Some oppo-
nents of the division maintain that practicing attorneys do not complain
of undue delay.'1 And the point is repeated that dividing the circuit
will have absolutely no effect in reducing the aggregate workload. 15
Finally, the Ninth Circuit may be sized by cost.' °6 Circuit expenses
for 1988 totalled $25.3 million, about one-fifth of the total for all the
courts of appeals. With an initial expenditure to establish the new
Twelfth Circuit confidently estimated at $1.4 million, there is some
speculation against logic and the whole experience of the federal gov-
ernment that the two new circuits would be more cost efficient and
would produce a net savings.107
This discussion of the size of the Ninth Circuit-its dimensions of
geography, population, judgeships, docket, and cost-more often then
103. Position Paper of the Circuit Executive, supra note 88, at 9-10. An outside evaluator
has concluded:
It is true that in recent years the Ninth Circuit has ranked low among the twelve
regional circuits in the number of appeals terminated on the merits per three judge
panel. The court has also had one of the poorest records for speed of case processing,
if one measures the median time from filing notice of appeal to disposition. However,
the court comes off quite favorably in the size of its backlog as measured by the
number of appeals pending per panel. Similarly, if one looks at the median time
for processing cases after the judges have begun work, the Ninth Circuit looks quite
good. Perhaps the judges on other courts of appeals handle more cases individually
because those courts do not have as many judgeships as their caseloads would
warrant.
Even if one were to focus solely on the Ninth Circuit's modest showing in the
statistical data on case participations per judge, it would be impossible to identify
a cause and effect relationship because so many other factors may also be at work
(for example, the Ninth Circuit's practice of writing self-contained memoranda in
cases not decided by published opinion).
Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the Large
Appellate Court, 56 U. Cm. L. Rav. 541, 600 n.255 (1989).
104. See Statement of Senator DeConcini, supra note 1, at 288. The former chief judge seems
to explain away the delay by attributing it to "slow panels," not the size of the court. Statement
of former Chief Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, supra note 92, at 6.
105. Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 481-83 (1990) (statement of James W. O'Brien,
State Bar of California) [hereinafter Statement of James W. O'Brien].
106. Position Paper of Senator Slade Gorton, supra note 69, at 4, 9.
107. Testimony of Retired Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, supra note 66, at 71-72. But see
Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 442 (1990) (statement of Chief Judge Barbara J. Rothstein)
[hereinafter Statement of Chief Judge Barbara J. Rothstein] ("[T]he cost . .. is certain to be
exorbitant.").
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not suffers from a lack of context. Two comparisons illustrate this.
Consider that the Ninth Circuit is today larger than the entire federal
appellate judiciary of 1939, with nearly twice the total national caseload
of 1939. There are approximately the same number of federal judges,
trial and appellate, in the entire Ninth Circuit as there are state judges,
trial and appellate in the single state of Arizona. Workload, not size,
is the problem of the Ninth Circuit. Even if one were disposed in favor
of circuit-splitting, it seems inescapable that any bill which keeps
Arizona and California together, as does Senate Bill 948, cannot promise
anything but a few speculative and marginal gains.
2. Consistency
Senator Gorton and Senator Hatfield expressed a serious concern for
decreased consistency and the latter gave as one main reason for division
"the increased likelihood of intracircuit conflicts."l08 Statistically, op-
portunities for conflicting holdings are numerous: on a twenty-eight
judge court there are 3,276 combinations of panels that may decide an
issue, without counting senior judges, district judges, and judges sitting
by designation. In 1989, there were 9,310 judge participations in panels. 109
Defenders from the Ninth Circuit respond:
Preservation of a single circuit with a single court of appeals has
resulted in the creation of a consistent and predictable body of
federal law throughout the western states and the Pacific maritime
area, facilitating trade and commerce and contributing to stability
and orderly progress. If [the admiralty and commercial law of the
Pacific ports] were divided between two separate and independent
Courts of Appeals, conflicts would inevitably develop and predict-
ability of the law would be diminished in this vitally important
region.110
If the popular press' explanation that politics is behind this current
proposal is correct, the sponsors apparently want conflicts between the
two proposed circuits. Then the federal law in the Pacific Northwest
would differ substantially from the federal law in Arizona, California,
and Nevada."' The sponsors are after a change in federal law, not
108. 135 CoNG. REc. S5026 (daily ed. May 9, 1990) (statement of Sen. Gorton); Id. at S5027
(statement of Sen. Hatfield); see also Statement of Senator Conrad Burns, supra note 67, at 275;
Response to Tentative Recommendations, supra note 1, at 6-9.
109. Position Paper of Senator Slade Gorton, supra note 69, at 336.
110. Position Paper of the Circuit Executive, supra note 88, at 5-6; see also Statement of
former Chief Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, supra note 92, at 314-16.
111. See 135 CoNG. REc. S5026-28 (daily ed. May 9, 1989); see also Position Paper of Senator
Slade Gorton, supra note 69, at 336-37.
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consistency. Senator Hatfield made much to do about a survey of
judges and attorneys conducted by the Ninth Circuit in which a majority
of judges and lawyers disagreed with the statement "[t]here is consis-
tency between panels considering the same issue."11" 2 Whatever else
might be said about the polling validity of this phrasing, a contrary
impression appears from other questions in the same survey. A majority
of both judges and lawyers agreed with statements that the "Ninth
Circuit decisions generally adhere to law announced in earlier opinions"
and that the "quality of published opinions is good. ' "1 3 As one prac-
ticing lawyer testified at the subcommittee hearing: "[S]plitting the
Ninth Circuit is not something that the lawyers who practice before the
Ninth Circuit have requested."" 4
Arguably, the Ninth Circuit has done more than other circuits to
deal with intracircuit conflicts. All fully briefed cases are reviewed by
central staff attorneys who code the issues on appeal into a computer." 5
Cases that raise the same issue and become ready for calendaring
around the same time are assigned to the same three-judge panel. This
computer program also informs later panels when an earlier panel has
heard but has not yet decided the same issue; the first panel that gets
the issue then decides it authoritatively." 6 Even judges who are not on
the hearing panel write memoranda that result not infrequently in
modification and clarification of a panel opinion. The limited en banc
procedure already described decides conflicts that arise despite these
procedures. A recent empirical study has concluded: "On the basis of
an admittedly limited sample, it does not appear that intracircuit
112. 135 CONG. REc. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatfield). See generally
NIrNT CmCUIT JUDICIAL CouNCdn, SuRvEy OF DISTRICT JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS REGARDINo THE
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH Cmcurr 19 (1987).
113. Position Paper of the Circuit Executive, supra note 88, at 8. A follow-up, more detailed,
survey is underway currently to identify inconsistent lines of precedent, and preliminary results
suggest there are few particular examples. Id. at 8-9.
114. Statement of Eric Redman, supra note 74, at 3. At the 1989 Judicial Conference of the
Courts of The Ninth Circuit, in a secret ballot among all judges and lawyer representatives
attending, 90% voted to oppose S. 948.
Lawyers voted 69 to 10 to oppose the measure. S. 948 is opposed by Bar Associations in
Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada and the Northern Mariana Islands. S. 948
has been endorsed by the Washington Bar Association and the Conference of Western Attorneys
General.
115. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68
CALnF. L. REV. 937, 945 (1980).
A more recent innovation with the Staff Attorneys Office illustrates the effort to monitor and
manage the law of the circuit. The Office reviews all appeals in the volatile area of sentencing
guidelines and notifies the panel of any relevant published or unpublished opinions. The system
will be computerized soon.
116. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRcurr GENERAL ORDERS 4.1 (1987).
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inconsistency is as much of a problem as many lawyers think.11 17 One
indication of the effectiveness of this scheme is the relatively small
number of en banc rehearings that are granted each year.
The gain in consistency to be expected from a division is that judges,
lawyers, and litigants could cope better with a smaller and more
predictable universe of case law. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of
the debate over consistency is the cynical charge of "discretionary
justice." The charge is that there is so much case law in the Ninth
Circuit that it has become increasingly easy for panels to act like legal
realist tribunals, that is to pick out the precedents that lead to the
desired result. In such an environment, philosophy becomes controlling
and such subjectivity generates uncertainty that attracts more appeals.
To the extent this argument is true, however, it is true throughout the
country and only more pronouncedly so in jurisdictions such as the
Ninth Circuit that have larger bodies of case law." 8 The problem would
persist in two new courts. Dividing the court simply will not stop it." 9
3. California Attitudes
Senator Gorton complained that the Northwest states "are simply
dominated by California judges and California attitudes."' 12  He is
concerned for a kind of geographical representation and for a regional
familiarity with his Pacific Northwest he says California judges lack.
He wants appellate judges who better understand the unique issues of
the Northwest.'' Senator Burns said that "it is [not] fair or in the best
interest of the judicial process" for citizens of states such as Montana
to suffer because California "continues to experience an economic and
population boom."' He compares the six circuits on the east coast
with the one circuit on the west coast to call for "judicial fairness,"
117. Hellman, supra note 103, at 544. If there is a perception of inconsistency it may be best
explained by the disarray in a few prominent areas of law, which are not characteristic of the
general law of the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 595; see also Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization
Act, 1990; Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 661-62 (1990) (statement of Arthur D. Hellman)
[hereinafter Statement of Arthur D. Helman]. See generally RESTRUCTURING JUsTIcE: THE
INNOVATIONS OF THE NnITH CmcUrr AND FUTRaE OF TSE FEDERAL COURTs (A. Hellman ed.
1990).
118. Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 448 (1990) (statement of Chief Judge Owen M.
Panner) [hereinafter Statement of Chief Judge Owen M. Panner].
119. See Helman, supra note 103, at 597-601.
120. 135 CoNa. REc. S5026 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
121. Position Paper of Senator Slade Gorton, supra note 69, at 281.
122. 135 CONG. REc. S5028 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Bums).
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invoking a kind of representatiort theory. 2 1 Senator Hatfield, another
co-sponsor, seems to distance himself from the California xenophobia
to state positively the desirability of a Northwest circuit comprised of
a small set of contiguous states with common interests-interests,
presumably that are not common with California's.' 24
Although "California attitudes" may be antithetical to the Pacific
Northwest, the sponsors' underlying i5temise that California judges are
idiosyncratic and monolithic, a subset among Ninth Circuit judges, is
nonsense. One need not be a Turnerian historian to observe, first, that
the coastal zeitgeist moves from either coast inward, and, second, that
western influence on the nation's life and law is in the ascendancy.
Hostility to California judges is more pronounced regarding environ-
mental law, and it seems to be an unfounded stereotype. 25 Anyone
who studied the judicial philosophies on the Ninth Circuit and then
took the time to understand the way hearing panels are constituted
would know better.'m Panels are drawn by computer from a pool that
123. Statement of Senator Conrad Burns, supra note 67, at 276.
124. 'Testimony of Senator Hatfield, supranote 64, at 253. Senator Hatfield explained:
Opponents of the Bill respond to such an argument by branding it as an illegitimate
attempt to "gerrymander" the make-up of the Court, or impermissibly balkanize
federal law. The former is not the motivation, and the latter will not be the result.
Circuit court boundaries were originally created to reflect this regional identity.
Circuit size was determined, in part, by identification of a small set of contiguous
states that shared a common background. The goal is not to avoid differences of
opinion on various legal issues, nor to splinter the uniform development of federal
caselaw. Rather, it is to foster reasoned decisions (which take into account the social,
economic and historical circumstances from which legal issues arise) by judges who
share similar backgrounds and experiences.
Id.
125. See San Francisco Chron., Mar. 12, 1990, at A16, col. 1 (editorial-Don't Split the Ninth
Circuit). The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, admittedly an institution without claim of
objectivity, surveyed the published opinions of the Ninth Circuit since 1987 on environmental
issues and found them to be "about evenly split between affirming and reversing judgments."
Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 514 (1990) (statement of Michael Traynor, Chair, Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund) [hereinafter Statement of Michael Traynor]. The study "revea[ed]
neither domination of a particular region by judges appointed from states outside the [northwest]
region nor an overall tendency in the existing Ninth Circuit to side with environmental interests."
Id. It seems noteworthy, however, that environmental groups are so visible in the opposition to
the proposal to divide the Ninth Circuit. Something must be at stake for them. Republican Senator
Wilson, a candidate for Governor in California, where environmental issues are important, has
raised an environmental hue and cry. See Moore, Debating an Appeals Court Boundaries, NAT'L
J., Mar. 10, 1990, at 582.
126. See Position Paper of'the Ciicuit Executive, supra note 88, at 8-9; see also Hellman,
supra note 103, at 547 n.20. The price for the arrangement of panels is not small, in time and
energy of judges. One thoughtful critic has suggested this is not worth it, that "the net is a
pattern of having judges sit together far too few times in the course of a cycle which requires
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includes all the judges on the Ninth Circuit. The program is designed
so that each judge sits with every other judge in the pool an equal
number of times, and sits at each place for holding court an equal
number of times. It is quite rare that all three judges from a panel are
from the same place. Except for the chief judge, the en banc court is
randomized in each case. To date, no one has tried to correlate decisions
with the geographic origins of the judges in order to test the validity
of the California stereotype.
To the extent that a "regional milieu" is relevant in a case, the
district court can be expected to take it into account. 27 At the appellate
level, a judge's hometown, as distinct from judicial philosophy, should
not be expected to play any role. Local bias is offensive to the notion
of a federal court. Balkanization of federal law is contrary to federalism.
The proper function of the regional courts of appeals is to federalize
the law.'2 The complaint that California judges dominate has never
been proven. 29 Even if it were true, however, Senate Bill 948 would
be of greater concern, for the supposed dominance of California judges
in the new Ninth Circuit would be strengthened drastically by the
division. The comparison to the East Coast, while instructive, should
not be pushed too far. °Granted, the East Coast, with multiple circuits,
has a commercial viability that does not seem to be weakened by the
the better part of two years to complete and yet travelling over a far-flung circuit." Hearing on
S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 684 (1990) (statement of former Sen. Roman L. Hruska)
[hereinafter Statement of Senator Roman L. Hruska].
127. Statement of Eric Redman, supra note 74, at 6. There is also some question whether the
division of the Ninth Circuit would generate and maintain appellate "victories" for the northwest.
Id.
128. Judge Wisdom explains why circuit splitting threatens this function:
If this process were carried to its logical conclusion, the states of Texas, California
and New York would each constitute a circuit. A United States Court of Appeals
does not. just settle disputes between litigants. It has a federalizing function as well
as a purely appellate function of reviewing errors. The federal courts' role is to
bring local policy in line with the Constitution and national policy. Within the
framework of "cases and controversies" and subject to all the appropriate judical
disciplines, federal courts adjust the body politic to stresses and strains produced by
conflicts (1) between the nation and the states and (2) between the government
(national, state and local) and private citizens asserting federally-created or federally-
'protected rights. The federalizing role of circuit courts should not be diluted by the
creation of a circuit court so narrowly based that it will be difficult for such a court
to overcome the influence of local prides and prejudices.
Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 Loy. L. REv. 787, 788 (1980). Arguments to the contrary
are simply wrong. See Statement of Mark C. Rutzick, supra note 72, at 565 ("The argument for
extra-regional appellate judges is at bottom historically ignorant and incorrect.").
129. Letter from former Chief Judge Goodwin to Senator Heflin 2 (Apr. 2, 1990) ("If there
is a California domination I am afraid that Diogenes and his lantern will have to find it.").
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existence of multiple federal appellate venues. But this resulted from
history and the accident of accumulated ad hoc redrawing of circuit
boundaries, accelerated in the East by earlier population growth and
economic development. It seems more prudent to recognize that history
has provided the West Coast with an opportunity to be a region in a
sense that the East Coast is not. We should be reluctant to unalterably
divide the West Coast without careful reflection. Finally, if a politicial
decision .mandates different federal law in different parts of the country,
then Congress should legislate those variations; they should not be
created by changing the structure of the federal court system.
4. Mastery of State Law
Upon the introduction of Senate Bill 948, Senator Packwood urged
that dividing the Ninth Circuit "will allow judges and their clerks to
develop an even greater mastery of the State laws which their circuit
encompasses than the high level of expertise which they currently
exhibit.' 130 First, the current "high level of expertise" does not appear
inadequate. Second, the statistics call the significance of this argument
into question. The Ninth Circuit currently decides about 225 appeals
in diversity cases each year and in three-fourths of those the district
judge, who in the typical case was a practitioner in that state's law, is
affirmed.' 3' The remaining 5,800-plus cases raise issues of federal law.
5. Reducing the Reversal Rate
Senator Packwood suggested that dividing the Ninth Circuit might
reduce the reversal rate by the Supreme Court. 32 Admittedly, the
statistics fluctuate from term to term, but as recently as October Term
1986 the Ninth Circuit ranked tenth among the twelve regional circuits
in reversal rate with a forty-seven percent reversal rate compared to a
national average of sixty-two percent. 33 This argument seems to be a
non sequitur. 3 4 Dividing the Fifth Circuit did not appreciably affect
130. 135 CoNo. REc. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Packwood); see also
Statement of Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, supra note 87, at 632.
131. Position Paper of the Circuit Executive, supra note 88, at 10. But cf. In re McLinn, 739
F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (questions of state law are reviewable under same
independent de novo standard as are questions of federal law).
132. 135 CoNo. REc. 55027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Packwood); see also
Statement of Chief Judge Owen M. Panner, supra note 118, at 449.
133. Position Paper of the Circuit Executive, supra note 88, at 10.
134. See Spaeth, Supreme Court Disposition of Federal Circuit Court Decisions, 68 JUDICATURE
245, 249-50 (1985); Uelmen, The Influence of the Solicitor General upon Supreme Court Disposition
of Federal Circuit Court Decisions: A Closer Look at the Ninth Circuit Record, 69 JUDICATuRE
361, 366 (1986).
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the number of cases claiming Supreme Court review from the regions
of the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. There is a rough perception
that the Ninth Circuit was a conservative court in the 1970s, which the
Carter appointments made more liberal for a time, and which the
Reagan appointments since have made more conservative. The popular
press' explanation is that the reversal rate was high for a time when
the Ninth Circuit was out of synchrony with the Supreme Court. This
argument may prove ultimately only that labelling any bench as large
as the Ninth Circuit must be a gross generalization and at best only
temporarily accurate.
6. A Postscript
At least in part, these arguments appear to be efforts to justify an
underlying political goal to shift the direction of law in the Ninth
Circuit, notwithstanding protests to the contrary. This strategy may be
attributable, perhaps, to some unarticulated realization that the tradi-
tional means of influencing the judiciary through appointment and
confirmation have become less effective, either because of the party
division between the President and the Congress or because the Ninth
Circuit bench has grown too large to pack easily. Nothing may be
inherently wrong with that goal. Indeed, the desire on the part of those
in the Pacific Northwest to have a circuit of their own, independent of
the California presence, goes back to the 1940s and likely will continue.
The judges who resist the division are practicing "politics" as well.'35
Their apparent desires for size and stability likewise fuel this debate.
The judges opposing the division may just be more "conservative" of
institutions not necessarily in ideology; some judges may relish judicial
administration on the grand scale; some might find it attractive to be
a member of a court larger in size than the first Senate; some judges
might prefer the status quo in order to hold on to the perquisite of
sittings in Hawaii.3 6
The overall senatorial impatience exhibited by Senate Bill 948 exhibits
a certain irony, however. The Ninth Circuit has a Republican majority
now, which can be expected to be quite substantial by the end of the
135. See Trigoboff, supra note 85, at 2, col 3. See generally JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TowARD
INSTrTUTIONAL ComrrY (R. Katzmann ed. 1988).
136. Judge Kozinski was quoted, tongue-in-cheek, as saying that he did not want to give up
circuit meetings in Hawaii. Trigoboff, supra note 85, at 15. Stranger considerations have controlled
redrawing decisions. See Baker, supra note 2, at 726 n.288 (Canal Zone alignment in the Fifth
Circuit depended on scheduled airline connections).
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current administration.' 7 When this ineluctable constitutional influence
of nomination and confirmation was disregarded during the ill-fated
court-packing plan of 1937,138 Senator James Byrnes of South Carolina
observed, "In]ever run for a train after you have caught it."
As a matter of politics, the national interest is the larger context in
which Congress must decide. The defenders of the Ninth Circuit bound-
ary assert a powerful defense against division sounding in our national
prominence in Pacific Rim commerce. Former Chief Judge Goodwin
testified: "Commercial law affecting worldwide maritime trade, aircraft
and automobile manufacturing plants, agriculture and the entertainment
industry is applied uniformly throughout a vast area of land and water
from which emerges about one-fifth of the federal litigation in the
United States.' ' 39 Moreover, the active circuit judges virtually unani-
mously oppose division. Their opposition, alongside that of environ-
mental groups and several prominent senators from some of the affected
states may be sufficient to stave off Senate Bill 948. Division of the
Fifth Circuit came after a protracted legislative debate, and only when
all three branches and their constituencies reached a general consensus
that the legislation was the only viable alternative.
C. Limits to Circuit Splitting
Beyond the particulars of the Ninth Circuit, the technique of splitting
circuits has an inevitable downside. It irreversibly lessens the "feder-
alizing function of courts of appeals."140 Subdividing courts of appeals
is a limited strategy and a reform that simply does not work. 41 The
division of the Fifth Circuit did not perform any lasting miracle. The
larger courts of appeals, with the larger problems-the District of
Columbia, Second, and Ninth Circuits-practically resist any feasible
division. 142
137. See Hellman, supra note 103, at 547 n. 19. See generally Goldman, Reagan's Judicial
Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICATURE 318 (1989).
138. See W. REHNQuisT, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAs, How IT Is 215-34 (1987).
139. Statement of former Chief Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, supra note 92, at 312; see also
Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 282 (1990) (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston) [hereinafter
Statement of Senator Alan Cranston]. See generally Lateef, supra note 63, at 11.
140. C. WRIGHT, supra note 26, at 974; Wisdom, supra note 128, at 788.
141. Gee, supra note 42, at 806 ("[Alre we to continue the splitting process until it becomes
mincing, with a United States Court of Appeals for the Houston Metropolitan Area?").
142. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function
of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 542, 587 (1969); Hellman, supra note 58, at
1192-1237.
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In the abstract, dividing circuits might be more feasible if the entire
geographical scheme could be redrawn, the approach rejected by the
Hruska Commission in 1973 as too unsettling. 43 This would permit an
initial levelling of caseload and judgeships. We might have twenty
circuits of nine judges organized with roughly equal caseload under a
completely redrawn system of boundary lines.'" This symmetry would
be gained, however, at a high cost in disruption. Much federalizing
influence of the courts of appeals would be lost. The balkanized
precedent of the law of the circuits would be worsened without any
compensating improvements. More circuits multiply intercircuit con-
flicts, and the resulting hegemony of national law is one of the principle
banes of the federal appellate court system.' 41 If circuit-splitting is a
bad idea, circuit-mincing is even worse.
Dividing the Ninth Circuit or using it as an excuse to create a system
of microcircuits simply does not address the real problem. The cure is
worse than the disease, for circuit-splitting does not solve the problems
of one circuit and merely postpones solution of the problems of two.'"4
Again, former Chief Judge Goodwin summed up the problem:
Splitting the Ninth Circuit, or other circuits, would not address the
real problem facing the Federal Courts of Appeals. The problem is
not structure, but workload. Creating more regional circuits would
not diminish the work, but merely divide it. The number of cases
that must be heard by three-judge panels nationwide would remain
the same and continue to grow no matter how many new circuits
are formed. '17
V. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE COURTS OF APPEALS
Congress must learn the common sense that dockets are mathemati-
cally distributive: to distribute the Ninth Circuit's current docket be-
tween the new ninth circuit and the new twelfth circuit will not diminish
the workload but merely will divide it. The number of appeals to be
heard would be the same whether those same western states comprised
one circuit or two circuits. The problems of the large circuit, for which
143. See supra text accompanying notes 37 and 45-56.
144. See Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. Rav. 448, 459 (1976); see also
infra note 198 and accompanying text.
145. Baker & McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1400,
1404-09 (1987).
146. See Baker, A Postscript on Precedent in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 36 Sw. L.J. 725, 742
(1982).
147. Goodwin, supra note 80, at 11.
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splitting is offered as a solution, are chiefly the result of adding
judgeships without doing more to meet the rising caseload. The "add
and divide" approach undermines important characteristics of the fed-
eral intermediate appellate courts.
A. Limitations on Creating Judgeships
The framers of the Constitution contemplated a minimal number of
federal judges to staff a few courts of quite limited jurisdiction.
Alexander Hamilton, perhaps naively, wrote in Federalist No. 81 of a
single federal judge in "four or five, or half a dozen federal districts." 1 8
Today we have ninety-four federal districts with 575 federal judges.
During their first decade, the nine courts of appeals were assigned
thirty judgeships; 49 today there are thirteen federal circuits with 168
circuit judges. 10 Increases have followed the congressional policy of
dealing with caseload growth by creating judgeships. Recent growth of
the bench, however, still has not kept pace. Circuit judges have been
delivered in litters by omnibus acts, and the litters have been getting
larger. Ten new circuit judgeships were created in 1961;15 only five
years later, six more were added;'52 two years later thirteen more;' 53 in
1978 thirty-five new circuit judgeships were created;'5 4 and in 1984,
after incremental additions in 1982 and 1983 were insufficient, another
twenty-four judgeships were added." Adding judges is a way to respond
to growth in caseload, of course, but this ad hoc solution may contribute
more to the problems of the large court. The turn-of-the-century design
for consistency and harmony in the law-that the same three-judge
panel would decide all the appeals in a circuit-passed from the scene
a long time ago. (No one is heard to advocate sixty circuits of three
judge panels.) Today there are thousands of permutations of three-
judge panels in the large courts of appeals. Monitoring the law becomes
148. THE FEDERALMST No. 81, at 547 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
149. Carrington, supra note 142, at 580 n.165.
150. 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1988). Between 1900 and 1988, the population of the United States
tripled and the number of appeals increased thirty-four-fold.
151. Act of May 19, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-36, 75 Stat. 80 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
544 (1988)).
152. Act of Mar. 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-372, 80 Stat. 75 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
544 (1988)).
153. Act of June 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-347, 82 Stat. 184 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
544 (1988)).
154. Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 544 (1988)).
155. Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 346 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
544 (1988)).
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more onerous. Intracircuit conflicts become more likely. En banc re-
hearings become unwieldy. 5 6 Relationships of judge to judge, panel to
panel, and panel to en banc court become more complex and tenuous.
15 7
Worse, adding judgeships does not achieve any lasting improvement.
A detailed study of the omnibus judgeship statutes found only a one
year impact on the appeals-per-panel ratio.' The major benefit thus
has been merely a kind of braking effect. To go on merely adding
judges will worsen the unintended effects on the courts of appeals.
Increasing the number of circuit judgeships, within the existing struc-
ture, should be a reform of last resort. 15 9 Even proponents of dividing
the Ninth Circuit admit this. 16 Moreover, economic concerns may make
Congress a more reluctant midwife, as new judgeships become more
expensive in an era of tightening budgets.
A decade ago, one federal jurisdiction seer predicted that in the
twenty-first century 5,000 circuit judges would be filling 1,000 volumes
of Federal Reporter, umpteenth series, disposing of approximately a
million appeals-each year.'16 More recent estimates from the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts predict an increase from
38,000 filings in 1988 to 66,000 filings in 2000.162 Increases in filings
of this magnitude will render the creation of additional judgeships an
inevitable last resort.
This inevitability raises the question whether there is some maximum
size of a court sitting in panels. 63 A committee of the Judicial Con-
156. See Ainsworth, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, 1981 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 523, 526-28; Tate, The Last Year of the "Old" Fifth (1891-1981), 27 Loy. L. REv. 689,
690-93 (1981).
157. See Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts:
A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IowA L. REv. 871,
918-19 (1983); Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of
Federal Judges, 55 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1983).
158. W. McLAUCH.AN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 107 (1984) ("The increase in judges only
delayed what appears to be a nearly inexorable climb in appeals taken to the courts of appeals.").
See generally Markey, On the Present Deterioration of the Federal Appellate Process: Never
Another Learned Hand, 33 S.D.L. REV. 371 (1987-88).
159. Heflin, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980-Overdue Relief for
an Overworked Court, 11 Cusr . L. REv. 597, 616 (1980) (citation omitted) ("Congress recognize[s]
that a point is reached where the addition of judges decreases the effectiveness of the court,
complicates the administration of uniform law, and potentially diminishes the quality of justice
within a circuit."); see also Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary,
31 AI.A. L. REv. 261, 270 (1980).
160. See Response to Tentative Recommendations, supra note 1, at 12.
161. See Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567, 567 (1975).
162. Position Paper of the Circuit Executive, supra note 88, at 4.
163. Posner, supra note 28, at 762 ("There is general recognition today that there is a natural
upper limit on the number of federal court of appeals judges and that we are either near, or
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ference selected the number nine in 1964, apparently based on the
numerology of the Supreme Court that became revelation at the failure
of the 1937 court-packing plan.'6 The Judicial Conference's last official
position, in 1974, was to set the maximum per court of appeals at
fifteen judgeships. 165 Senate sponsors of Senate Bill 948 initially used
this argument and this figure to urge the division of the Ninth Circuit.'6
A hardline approach likewise would call for the division of the Fifth
Circuit, previously divided just nine years ago, because it has fifteen
judgeships and has requested two more. If Congress passes the pending
judgeship bill, five of the twelve circuits will have fifteen or more
judges. 67 In fact, the new Ninth Circuit to be created by Senate Bill
948 with nineteen judgeships would itself be a candidate to suffer an
immediate division under a rule of fifteen.
The strategy of adding judges shows signs of playing out. 68 Enlarging
the federal judiciary is costly. It places strains on the appointment
process and makes more likely the possibility that unqualified or
unworthy candidates will be given life tenure. A larger appellate judi-
ciary results inevitably in more conflicting opinions, which in turn
creates greater uncertainty and generates more litigation. The larger the
appellate branch, the less familiar and less collegial the judges become,
and the esprit de corps suffers along with the work product. As the
opportunity for individual contribution and recognition diminishes, so
too do accountability and the attractiveness and prestige of the position.
The Federal Courts Study Committee dramatically described the current
situation:
In the past three decades the number of appellate judges nationally
has almost trebled, ranging now from six in the First Circuit to
twenty-eight in the Ninth. The average court of appeals has thirteen
judges. If caseload were the sole determinant, and using the Judicial
Conference's 255 participations standard, there would today be 206
judgeships for the twelve regional circuits, not the present 156. The
have already exceeded, that limit."); see also C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3510, at 45 (1984).
164. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (1964). But see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
9 (1968) (recommendation of 13 and 15 judges respectively for the Ninth and Fifth Circuits).
165. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF ma UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 48 (1974).
166. 135 CONG. REc. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatfield).
167. Position Paper of the Circuit Executive, supra note 88, at 4. See generally S. 2027, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
168. See Position Paper of Senator Slade Gorton, supra note 69, at 4.
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average court would have seventeen judges, and at least four of the
courts would be on the brink of twenty judgeships. Applying the
same standard to conservative caseload projections suggests a need
by 1999 for 315 appellate judges, with an average court of twenty-
four judges (and forty-nine on the Ninth Circuit). Tribunals of
seventeen, much less twenty-four, sitting in panels of three, may
resemble a judgeship pool more than a single body providing unified
circuit leadership and precedent. Still, large courts such as these
may be workable. Whether tribunals of thirty or forty judges will
be workable is more problematic. The question is not simply one
of administration but of the effect, both within the circuit and
nationally, of so many uncoordinated opinions from so many
judges. 169
The Committee's final report offers some new alternatives.
B. Some Other Possibilities
In November 1988, the 100th Congress created the Federal Courts
Study Committee ("Committee") as an ad hoc committee within the
Judicial Conference of the United States.1 70 Appointed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the fifteen-person committee included representatives of the
three branches of federal government, state government officials, prac-
titioners, and academics. Congress gave the Committee fifteen months
to examine the problems facing the federal courts and to develop a
long term plan for the judiciary. Among the subjects within the explicit
charge to the Committee, Congress asked for an evaluation of the
structure and administration of the courts of appeals. Perhaps the
timing of the introduction of Senate Bill 948 was a not so subtle attempt
to influence the Committee's deliberation about dividing the Ninth
Circuit. The spohsors of Senate Bill 948 did in fact respond to the
Committee's tentative recommendations 71 and directly requested that
169. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CommTrEE REPORT, supra note 75, at 114. The same projection
would predict a need for 392 circuit judges by 2009 (33 per circuit with the Fifth at 49 and the
Ninth at 61 judges). See generally V. FLANIoAN, APPELLATE COURT CASELOADS: A STATISTICAL
OvE viw Table 22 (1989).
170. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1989). See generally Weiss,
The Federal Courts Study Committee Begins its Work, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 15 (1989); Symposium,
1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1. The Committee's efforts already are seeing legislative movement. See
The Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(title III) (1990); see also S. 2620, 101 Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (creating a 5-year intercircuit conflict
resolution demonstration); 136 CoNG. REc. 56154 (daily ed. May 14, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Heflin).
171. Senators Gorton, Hatfield, and Stevens repeatedly agreed with the direction of analysis
of the Committee. See generally Response to Tentative Recommendations, supra note 1.
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the Committee's final report include a specific endorsement for the
proposal.172 The Committee resisted these efforts, for the most part,
and in the final report took "no position" on the proposal, deciding
instead to defer to the political process.1 73 The section of the Commit-
tee's final report on appellate structure, however, is something akin to
a Chinese menu of structural reforms and provides an important
framework for understanding the .debate over dividing the Ninth Circuit.
The Committee begins this section of the final report with the given
that the federal appellate courts are faced with a "crisis of volume"
that will continue and require some "fundamental change.' ' 74 The
present geographic circuits share a few essential characteristics that
define their function: they are the only courts between the district courts
and the Supreme Court; their jurisdiction is an appeal as of right; their
basic decisional unit is the three-judge panel; they are geographically
based; and their total number (thirteen) still reflects, though somewhat
faintly, the congressional history that once correlated the number of
circuits to the number of Supreme Court justices. 7  The Committee's
recommendation: "Fundamental structural alternatives deserve the care-
ful attention of Congress, the courts, bar associations and scholars over
the next five years. The Committee itself has studied various structural
alternatives. Without endorsing any, it lists a few here to stimulate
further inquiry and discussion.' ' 76
First, the present geographic circuits could be dissolved and new
circuit boundaries could be drawn and redrawn periodically to achieve
172. Letter from Senators Slade Gorton and Mark 0. Hatfield to Judge Joseph F. Weiss,
Chair of the Federal Courts Study Committee (Sept. 5, 1989).
173. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMTrTEE REPORT, supra note 75, at 123 ("We take no position
on whether the Ninth Circuit should be split. That question involves issues peculiar to that region
that we are not qualified to address, given our deadline and resources.")
The Ninth Circuit otherwise was featured prominently in the Committee's report. Its uniqueness
and size were emphasized. Id. at 114. As previously mentioned, the limited en bane procedure
was endorsed. Id. at 115. The court's administrative innovations were found praiseworthy. Id. at
115-16.
174. Id. at 109; see also A.B.A. STANDING COMMrTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS,
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REExAMINIo STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFTER A CENTURY
OF GROWTH (1989) 1-10 [hereinafter Report of the A.B.A. Standing Committee]; Rehnquist,
Introduction to THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 11-13 (C.
Harrison & R. Wheeler eds. 1989).
175. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 75, at 113.
176. Id. at 116-17. The Committee did label changing the appeal-of-right feature of appellate
jurisdiction to a discretionary, certiorari-like, jurisdiction to be a "last resort." Id. at 116. The
Committee straightforwardly rejected the "single national appellate court" proposal. Id. at 117.
See generally Baker & McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1400
(1987).
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smaller regional courts with nine members. 77 All the regional courts
could be bound to follow the prior precedent of any other panel in
every other region, subject to Supreme Court overruling. One central
division of representative judges could review panel decisions and resolve
remaining conflicts as a kind of national en banc court. This would
reduce the expectation of more frequent conflicts generated by more
circuits without relying on the Supreme Court.
Second, an additional appellate tier could be created. 178 Twenty to
thirty regional appellate divisions of nine judges each could be created
to replace the present thirteen to hear appeals as of right, and four or
five upper-tier appellate courts could be created with larger regions to
consider discretionary appeals from the regional divisions, with Supreme
Court jurisdiction to hear a second discretionary appeal from the upper-
tier courts. This structure could absorb the expected large cohorts of
additional judgeships and, again, would handle the expectation of more
frequent conflicts.
Third, national subject matter courts could be created with specialized
national jurisdiction over such subjects as tax, admiralty, criminal, civil
rights, labor, administrative, and other subjects alongside the present
circuits. 179 Alternatively, subject matter panels could be created within
the existing circuits.
Fourth, the federal courts of appeals could be merged into a single
centrally-organized court that could also create and abolish special
subject matter panels as appropriate. The new organization could
develop internal mechanisms for resolving conflicts.
Fifth, the existing circuits might be consolidated into perhaps five
"jumbo" circuits that might resemble in many ways the current Ninth
Circuit. 80 Judges in the jumbo circuits could rotate among specialized
subject matter panels.
The Federal Courts Study Committee entreats us to reconceptualize
the debate over the courts of appeals. The direction of analysis in
Senate Bill 948, that "big is bad"-that we must add circuit judges to
keep up with caseload and then divide courts of appeals to keep them
recognizable as courts-is one direction of thought. Admittedly, it has
been the congressional approach now for one hundred years. But, the
Committee's challenge to us is to stop thinking linearly, or at least to
think against the direction taken in the past:
177. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMwrmEE REPORT, supra note 75, at 118-19.
178. Id. at 119-20.
179. Id. at 120-21; see also Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the
Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. C. L. Rav. 603, 607-11 (1989).
180. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY ComiTaTEE REPORT, supra note 75, at 122-23.
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The current debate between the Ninth Circuit and the other circuits
revolves around two very different conceptions of an appellate court.
The Ninth Circuit works as a rotating system of three-judge panels
(over 3,000 combinations are possible) covering an enormous geo-
graphic area, bonded by a very capable administration and serviced
by the nation's only small, or limited, in banc of ten randomly
selected judges and the chief judge. Other courts prefer the tradi-
tional concept of a smaller, more intimate, unitary tribunal, even
as their growing caseload makes this ideal more and more difficult
to sustain. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit represents a workable alter-
native to the traditional model. If not, the entire present appellate
system needs restructuring before other circuits become the "jumbo"
courts toward which they are gradually evolving. 8'
Let us suppose, therefore, that "bigger is better," that we might
reconceptualize the system of federal intermediate appellate courts in
the direction of the evolution of the Ninth Circuit.
C. An Elaboration on the Possibility of Consolidation
Adding judges and dividing courts of appeals is a strategy that seems
to have played out. It is exactly the wrong direction for reform. If the
addition of judges is accepted as an inevitable response to an even
more inevitable growth in the appellate caseload, Congress ought to
consider consolidation of the intermediate tier. The Ninth Circuit thus
may be better viewed as a harbinger than an aberration. Since 1978,
the Ninth Circuit has pursued reorganization and modernization while
exceeding each successively-announced norm of the maximum number
of judges, calling into question those norms and the very notion that
there is a norm. Innovations in appellate procedures have been aug-
mented with technology. Reorganization into administrative units has
helped manage caseload. A reformed en banc has been limited for the
larger scaled court. Computers have helped improve caseload monitor-
ing. Modern communications link chambers in San Francisco and
Honolulu almost as instantaneously and just as reliably as two chambers
on different floors of the same courthouse. Rather than divide the
Ninth Circuit to make two new courts that soon will resemble the
beleaguered other circuits, Congress ought to hold the mirror the other
way. The tentative lesson to be learned from the Ninth Circuit may be
that reorganization and modernization make possible a consistent and
efficient court of appeals regardless of size, or at least for a number
181. Id. at 122-23.
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of judgeships far beyond currently articulated norms. Therefore the
alternative legislative attitude in the direction of consolidation ought to
be considered.
Consolidation of the intermediate tier holds the promise of eliminat-
ing, or at least drastically reducing, intercircuit conflicts, a peculiar evil
of our current structure.8 2 Two innovations against caseload growth
and judgeship creation, the en banc rehearing and the law of the circuit,
today work in tandem to generate an ersatz autonomy that makes the
intercircuit conflict possible. When Congress continued to create judge-
ships to deal with increases in filings, more permutations of three-judge
panels began to threaten two institutional values of the intermediate
court: consistency among panel decisions and the control of a majority
of the judges over the law of the court of appeals. The en banc court
evolved as a mechanism to preserve these two values. However, en
banc rehearings result in considerable expense and delay, for litigants
and courts alike. Consequently, there developed a concept of the law
of the circuit or the law of interpanel accord. This concept was
conceived to minimize en banc rehearings by preventing intracircuit
conflicts: A three-judge panel must adhere to previous panel decisions
as binding precedent, absent an intervening decision by the en banc
court or the Supreme Court. This regional stare decisis results in fewer
intracircuit conflicts, but it makes possible intercircuit conflicts, because
decisions by other courts of appeals are merely persuasive authorities.
As a result, each court of appeals has become a junior supreme court,
final if not infallible on an issue of federal law in each circuit unless
and until the Supreme Court grants review. Because the Supreme Court
reviews less than one percent of appellate decisions, the balkanization
of federal law has grown more serious with the growing circuit dockets
over the years. 83 A radical solution to this problem, one of the
directions of thought highlighted in the Final Report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee, would be to reorder a complete consolidation
of the existing circuit boundaries.'8
The idea of a single, unified national court of appeals has an alluring
simplicity: Eliminate altogether the geographical boundaries between
the courts of appeals and consolidate them into one unified adminis-
trative and jurisdictional tier of an intermediate court. Logically, then,
there could be no such thing as an intercircuit conflict. The unified
182. See Baker & McFarland, supra note 145, at 1404-09; Baker, supra note 2, at 720-24; see
also Lateef, supra note 63, at 7-8.
183. See Baker & McFarland, supra note 145, at 1406.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 170-81.
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court, however, would require some appropriate mechanism to deal
with the equally logical inevitability of more numerous intracircuit
conflicts among three-judge panels.
From time to time, various commentators have considered this pro-
posal. 85 The unified model depends on a concept that there be a single
United States Court of Appeals. All geographical circuits would be
abolished, and presumably the Federal Circuit would be absorbed as
well. Professor Paul D. Carrington, a proponent of this model, believes
that this would relieve the circuit judges of their preoccupation with
maintaining the law of the circuit (an effort he discredits as misguided)
and also would make more efficient use of judicial personnel. A unified
model presents sophisticated organizational options for administering
such a necessarily complex institution. The present discussion relies on
Professor Carrington's blueprint for dealing with the judicial disecon-
omies of scale, although admittedly with some poetic license.'8
There are many possible variations on this theme. This discussion is
intended to illustrate the direction of thinking toward consolidation to
generalize from the experience of the Ninth Circuit. Professor Carring-
ton's formulation includes "General Divisions," "Special Divisions,"
and a national "Administrative Panel" that presumably would resemble
the present Judicial Conference of the United States.
Appeals would continue to be decided by three-judge panels. Three-
judge panels, however, would be consolidated from among "General
Divisions," usually comprised of four judges from four different but
proximate states. Thus there would be forty or more regular general
divisions. Active circuit judges would be assigned to general divisions
by a national administrative panel that would be chosen by seniority
to serve for a substantial term of years. Some provision might be made
for automatic rotation among general divisions that prove too stable
in membership (for example, no change in membership for three years).
Each general division would have jurisdiction to hear appeals from
an appropriate number of specifically identified district judges. The
district judges whose appeals were earmarked to a particular general
division would sit in one of the four states represented on the general
division. Although different general divisions of the court of appeals
185. See Burdick, Federal Courts of Appeals: Radical Surgery or Conservative Care, 60 Ky.
L.J. 807, 812 (1972); Carrington, supra note 142, at 612-17; Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility To
Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 576, 591-95 (1974);
Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or
a Molehill?, 71 CAUiF. L. REv. 913, 940-41 (1983).
186. See generally Carrington, supra note 142; Carrington, supra note 19.
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would regularly review different district judges in the same district, still
each individual district judge and the litigants in the case would have
a fairly good idea of the appellate panel from the moment a matter
was assigned to the trial judge. The argument is that any cost of greater
perceived differences among trial judges in the same district, because
they would be reviewed by different three-judge panels, would be offset
by the benefit of the identifiable and stable appellate panel.
Appellate procedures would be characterized by greater orality. 8 7
Indeed, the new appellate procedure in the typical appeal would imitate
the English tradition with an emphasis on oral presentations by the
advocates and an oral decision, with assurance of disclosure of the
reactions of each panel member, delivered from the bench without
conference. The written opinion for the court, John Marshall's inno-
vation of the nineteenth century, would no longer be the norm. 88 Every
effort would be made to take full advantage of modern technology, by
experimenting, for example, with closed circuit televised hearings.189
This plan assumes that few appeals would require the three-judge
hearing panel to write full opinions. This determination might be made
at the oral presentation just described. In these appeals, the hearing
panel would be augmented to seven judges, as described below. The
likely case for this augmented hearing would be an appeal raising a
substantial issue of federal law, such as a difficult issue of statutory
construction. Only these augmented hearings would result in the pub-
lished opinion produced in the Marshall manner, with a conference of
the judges, collegial deliberation, and extended revisions of drafts. With
the exception of a special division en banc rehearing explained below,
these augmented panel decisions would be the law of the land, normally
without expectation of further review in the Supreme Court, given their
statutory nature. Thus the current notion of the law of the circuit
would be expanded nationally. More correctly, this would undo the
perversion of "percolation" that is fundamentally "hurtful to the
inherent nature of a national law."'' 9
The augmentation of the hearing panel from three to seven judges
in the Marshall-style opinion-of-the-court appeals would come from the
187. See generally Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 MD.
L. REv. 732 (1983).
188. See Lumbard, Current Problems of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 CORNELL L. Rv.
29, 37-38 (1968); Merrill, Could Judges Deliver More Justice if They Wrote Fewer Opinions?, 64
JUDICATURE 435, 471 (1981).
189. Baker, supra note 36, at 264.
190. Baker, Siskel and Ebert at the Supreme Court, 87 MICH. L. Rav. 1472, 1487 (1989). See
generally Sturley, Observations on the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction in Intercircuit
Conflict Cases, 67 TEx. L. REv. 1251 (1989).
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membership of "Special Divisions." Assignment of a judge to a special
division of approximately eight judges, by subject matter, would be
supplementary to the general division assignment, keyed to the identity
of the district judge, already described. Thus, each active circuit judge
would have a general division assignment and a special division assign-
ment. Special division assignments would last perhaps as long as eight
years and would be made by the national administrative panel by some
calculus to include preference, seniority, location, and lot. There might
be some provision for rotation, one judge off/one judge on, each year,
but the special divisions would be selected to assure substantial stability.
There would be a special division for each subject in which a
substantial number of full opinions would be required, for example
antitrust and related economic regulation, taxation, intellectual prop-
erty, bankruptcy, government contracts, labor law, securities regulation,
federal tort claims, federal crimes, federal civil procedure, federal
criminal procedure, and civil rights legislation. Special divisions could
be created or abolished by the national administrative panel. These
assignments might be analogized to committee assignments in the Con-
gress that develop a particular expertise, to go along with a generalist's
competence. Each special division would be expected to maintain a
coherent body of law on its subject matter. The present en banc
responsibility would be shifted to the special divisions that, if necessary,
could sit en banc and review the augmented seven judge hearing panel.
This unified model, distinguished from the current system by greater
orality and greater subject matter specialization, is designed to realize
the ideal of an appellate system that is speedy, inexpensive, and just.
Greater coherency in the national law is an important purpose behind
this design. An effort to compromise the generalist-court versus spe-
cialist-court debate is much in evidence.' 9' Subject matter grouping of
appeals, which would be of dubious worth within the present regional
circuits, would offer substantial efficacy in dealing with a national
docket of a national court.192 Intercircuit conflicts would be eliminated
by definition. The increased likelihood of intracircuit conflicts would
be lessened, first by the constancy of the general division in less
significant appeals decided orally in summary fashion, and second by
191. See generally Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through Subject
Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 471 (1983); Overton, A Prescription for the Appellate
Caseload Explosion, 12 FiA. ST. U.L. REV. 205 (1984); Report of the A.B.A. Standing Committee,
supra note 174.
192. See Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German Design from an
American Perspective, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 57-58 (1981).
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the expertise of the special division in augmented panels and the
capability of en banc rehearing. The delay and cost of panel rehearing
and en banc rehearing in the current system would be replaced by the
augmented panel and special division en banc rehearing, presumably
with comparable measures of cost and delay, but with an expectation
for greater coherency in the law.
The most obvious criticism of the unified model is that it fragments
and specializes the federal judiciary. As has been suggested, however,
this model is more fairly viewed as a compromise of that larger debate,
which will not be rehearsed here. Other objections are more substantial.
First, each general division, unrestrained by publishing an opinion in
the run of the cases, is a potential aberration from the national law.
This risk seems no different, however, from the current system of three-
judge panels often deciding appeals with unpublished opinions, subject
to altogether rare en banc review and Supreme Court discretionary
review. There is an admitted tradeoff between the geographical stability
in the present system and the doctrinal stability promised in the model,
but the conceded purpose of the model is to shift judicial emphasis
from making the law of the circuit to making the national law on a
particular subject.
Second, administrative worries appear daunting. Case assignment,
however, would be just as automatic in most courts of appeals in the
current system.'19 Techniques and technologies developed in the larger
circuits, especially the Ninth Circuit, might suggest the feasibility of
administering a unified intermediate court. Of course, regional admin-
istration, similar to the current clerks' offices in the circuits, would be
possible.
What might be called ancillary decisional differences may be exac-
erbated in the model. For example, the Special Division on Antitrust
might interpret the same ancillary procedural issue differently from the
Special Division on Civil Rights Legislation. Arguably, the harmony in
the principal subjects divisions might justify this, and, perhaps, the
procedural special division could reconcile such differences. Any loss
of judicial collegiality from eliminating the current geographic circuits
would be more than made up for in the assignments to a four-member
general division and an eight-member special division.
Finally, the criticism that this organization would make it easier for
Congress to add judges is quite apt, for the unified model can absorb
193. See Deane & Tehan, Judicial Administration, in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 1, 10 (1981). See generally Whittaker, Differentiated
Case Management in United States Courts of Appeals, 63 F.R.D. 457 (1974).
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an indeterminate number of circuit judges to be arranged in greater
numbers of general and special divisions of expanding membership.
This weakness may be the model's greatest strength, however. Although
adding judges to the court of appeals is a remedy to be resisted, the
political reality of the last fifty years suggests judgeship creation is
virtually inevitable. Therefore, any model ought to be designed to
absorb new circuit judges.
Although this proposal is a radical departure from our present court
system, our contemporary reality begs for some sort of radical solution.
At worst, this proposal provides an alternative to the short-sighted
Senate Bill 948 proposal to divide the Ninth Circuit. The Federal Courts
Study Committee characterized the Ninth Circuit as being in a kind of
debate with the other circuits over the future design of the intermediate
appellate tier. If Senate Bill 948 is enacted and the Ninth Circuit is
divided into two courts of appeals that resemble all the others, that
debate is silenced, and viable alternatives to our current structure will
be lost forever.
The co-sponsors of Senate Bill 948 respond to judges, committees,
and scholars that maintaining the court as an "experiment" is a
disservice to their Ninth Circuit constituents. They say the problems
are immediate and growing. '9 This is a telling argument. But the premise
of this article is not to keep the Ninth Circuit intact at any cost.
Rather, the position here is to wait and see if the Ninth Circuit provides
a preferable future appellate structure, at least until the process con-
templated by the Federal Courts Study Committee plays itself out, and
at least for the anticipated five year period of debate and study called
for by the Committee. The former chief judge of the Ninth Circuit
once delivered an appropriate "closing argument":
The Ninth Circuit is the only remaining laboratory in which to test
whether the values of a large circuit can be preserved. If we fail,
there is no alternative to fragmentation of the circuits, centralization
of administrative authority in Washington, increased conflict in
circuit decisions, a growing burden on the Supreme Court, and
creation of a fourth tier of appellate review in the federal system.
If we succeed, no further division of circuits will be necessary.
Indeed, combining the circuits into four or five might well be
feasible-creating stronger and more effective appellate courts, light-
ening the burden on the Supreme Court, and resulting in a decen-
194. See, e.g., Response to Tentative Recommendations, supra note 1, at 3-4; see also Statement
of Kenneth 0. Eikenberry, supra note 87, at 629.
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tralized and more efficient administrative system for the federal
judicial system.195
Thus, to divide the Ninth Circuit now would be to lose the benefit of
an experiment in judicial administration that has not yet run its course,
an experiment that may be critical to understanding the future of the
federal appellate courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Admittedly, some do not deem the current circuit boundary lines to
be as ephemeral and arbitrary as this article and the consolidation
proposal make them out to be. There are certain settled expectations
of substantive law, practice, and procedure drawn up with the twelve
regional courts of appeals. But the strategy of adding judges and
dividing circuits simply has been played out and is no longer defensible
as a long-range plan. Senate Bill 948 is an idea whose time has come
and gone. The justifications offered so far for dividing the Ninth
Circuit simply do not withstand a close scrutiny. Everyone must admit
that any change is likely to be less than wholly desirable in itself, and
thus proposals must be weighed not against the ideal, but against other
possibilities.
Arguably, on the occasion of a congressionally-commissioned evalu-
ation recently conducted by the Federal Courts Study Committee,
assumptions and settled expectations ought to be set aside or, at least,
ought to be drawn into question. The history of the circuit boundaries
teaches that "[m]erely redrawing court boundaries would have the same
effect on the present federal appellate crisis that a weatherman's map
marks have on the weather."'19 That is why Senate Bill 948 is so
unsatisfactory, the approach so anachronistic. Dividing the Ninth Cir-
cuit is the least available application of the strategy of division. It will
prove nothing that has not been demonstrated repeatedly, most recently
195. Schroeder, Jim Browning as a Leader of Judges: A View from a Follower, 21 Asuz. ST.
L.J. 3, 7 (1989) (quoting Chief Judge James R. Browning). A member of the Federal Courts
Study Committee has echoed this sentiment:
We hope, however, that one message will penetrate: we are headed for times where
every circuit may look like today's Ninth, and the Ninth (and others) may double
in size. In the time left, we must ask ourselves whether a different structure is
preferable, or whether we will be best served by retaining in place as we begin the
third century of the federal courts the same scheme the Evarts Act established a
century ago as the federal courts began their second century.
Campbell, Into the Third Century: Views of the Appellate System from the Federal Courts Study
Committee, 74 MAss. L. Rlv. 292, 298 (1989).
196. Baker, supra note 36, at 290.
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at the division of the Fifth Circuit. 197 And that is why consolidation is
so oppositely intriguing. Consolidation of the circuits into a single,
unified court of appeals would allow for other innovations in case
management and subject matter specialization that, at least theoretically,
promise to help solve the profound problems facing the intermediate
tier. If complete consolidation is considered too radical, then Congress
at least ought to consider regrouping the existing circuits into four to
six "mega-circuits" to achieve at least some of the economies of
consolidation. This idea deserves more studied consideration. 98 The
Ninth Circuit ought to be thought of as a model for the courts of
appeals, not as a problem.
197. This is a reason to resist, not to embrace this strategy for the Ninth. But see Letter of
Bruce C. Navarro, supra note 68, at 7.
198. This is a proper function of Congress. Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 13
(1990) (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton) (quoting former Chief Judge Browning). Attorney General
Thornburgh testified before the Federal Courts Study Committee on the general problem:
What the Committee has not done, nor could it have reasonably been expected to
do in the short time allotted, is to evaluate measures to return logic to the chaos
and historical accident of circuit boundaries. It makes little sense to have one circuit
with six judges (the First Circuit) and another with 28 judges (the Ninth Circuit).
We must ultimately come to grips with the historical anomalies of the regional
circuits and develop ways to maintain consistency and predictability.
Statement of Attorney General Richard Thornburgh before the Federal Courts Study Committee
7 (Jan. 31, 1990) (copy on file at Arizona State Law Journal). But see Letter from Bruce C.
Navarro, supra note 68, at 7 (Department of Justice endorsement of S. 948).
I am in full agreement with Senator Hatfield, who explained: "one of the major goals of the
sponsors of S. 948 has been accomplished .... For too long, the problems facing the Ninth
Circuit, and the entire federal court system for that matter, have not received the thoughtful
attention of Congress and the public discussion they deserve." Statement of Senator Hatfield,
supra note 64, at 250. My effort here is to join the debate and to bring more attention to it.
